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ABSTRACT
Bankruptcy Prediction in the Casino Industry
by
David W. Patterson, CPA
Dr. Bernard Fried, Examination Committee Chair 
Assistant Professor o f  Hospitality Finance and Accounting 
University of Nevada Las Vegas
An exploratory study o f the effectiveness of traditional bankruptcy prediction 
models as applied to the casino industry. The study uses financial information from a 
sample o f failed and non-failed casino companies to evaluate the ability o f bankruptcy 
prediction models developed for general industry usage to predict financial failure in the 
casino industry.
The models tested were the ones developed by Edward I. AJtman, Edward B. 
Deakin and Christine V. Zavgren. The financial information utilized in the study was 
limited to that which could be obtained from publicly available information sources. The 
sample size was limited to the number of failed firms for which information was 
available and an equal number o f non-failed firms.
The study showed that traditional bankruptcy prediction models did not 
significantly enhance the ability to predict business failure in the casino industry beyond 
a random fail/no-fail prediction.
I l l
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Since the opening o f  Resorts International in Atlantic City in 1978, the amount of 
money invested in the casino industry has grown from millions o f dollars to billions o f 
dollars. The industry has accomplished much o f  this growth through public stock 
offerings, public debt offerings and an increasingly large amount o f bank debt. Not only 
has there been an increase in the magnitude o f the investment in the casino industry the 
number o f individuals directly and indirectly investing has also increased significantly. 
With this increased investment and increased investor base has come a more complex 
vulnerability to potential loss caused by business failure. There has been no published 
research concerning methodologies to predict business failure in the casino industry.
Beginning with the research studies of William H. Beaver in 1966 and Edward I. 
Altman in 1968, several models have been developed which use financial ratios to predict 
bankruptcy. Each o f these models uses different methodologies or different financial 
ratios. None of the research done in the development o f these models has specifically 
been directed towards the applicability o f  the models to the casino industry.
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Since the financial dynamics o f the casino industry has qualities that are different 
from other businesses, it is possible that the financial relationships that would indicate the 
likelihood o f bankruptcy would also be different from other businesses. If there is a 
model or models that would more accurately predict financial failure for the casino 
industry, utilization o f those models could assist in making decisions concerning 
investments in the casino industry.
Problem statement
The objective o f this study is to analyze failed casinos using traditional 
bankruptcy prediction models in order to evaluate their ability to predict financial failure 
in the casino industry.
Limitations
A limitation o f this analysis is the availability o f  financial data on casino 
businesses that have failed. Another limitation is the consistency and level o f detail o f 
the presentation o f the data that is available.
Delimitation
Due to the traditions o f the casino industry, property specific financial data is 
generally kept highly confidential. In general, sufficient financial data to perform 
meaningful analysis is only available for publicly traded companies. The data used in 
this study is therefore limited to that which is available through documents filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.
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Since the first bankruptcy prediction study by William Beaver in 1966. there have 
been numerous bankruptcy prediction studies in the financial literature. The models 
tested in this study are limited to the one developed by Edward I. Altman, the one 
developed by Edward B. Deakin and the one developed by Christine V. Zavgren.
The Altman model is generally considered the landmark model in bankruptcy 
prediction; it was the first published study that used multi-variant analysis to study the 
differences between failed and non-failed firms, by using multiple ratios simultaneously. 
The Altman model, which was first published in 1968, is still the most widely used and 
widely quoted bankruptcy prediction model.
The Deakin model is another early multi-variant analysis model that is generally 
cited and used as a standard for evaluating new approaches to bankruptcy prediction. It 
uses different ratios than the Altman model and may produce different results when 
applied to gaming analysis.
The Zavgren model was chosen because it uses a different approach than either 
the Altman or the Deakin model, and may yield different conclusions from those o f the 
other two models.
Definitions
Acid Test Ratio; The ratio o f  quick assets to current liabilities
Business Failure: The inability o f  a firm to meet its obligations when due. For 
purposes o f this study, the firm filing bankruptcy indicates financial failure.
Casino Industry: The population o f  all casino companies that offer typical casino 
games, including table games and slot machines. Includes casinos in all jurisdictions.
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Failed casinos in this study did not include any California card clubs, Indian reservation 
casinos, sports or race booking facilities, as none of these types o f casinos that had failed 
were identified. Since the financial characteristics of these casinos may or may not be 
similar to the casinos that were identified in the study, the results may or may not be valid 
for the casino types not specifically studied.
Collinearity: Describes a relationship between two variables. .According to 
Zavgren, ‘Tn a sense, multi-collinearity is not a problem in discriminatory analysis, since, 
strictly speaking, the predictive ability o f the function is not affected. The inter- 
correlations among variables may be used to enhance discriminatory power." (Zavgren. 
1983. p. 15).
Current Assets: Cash plus marketable securities plus receivables plus inventories 
plus prepaid expenses.
Current Liabilities: Accounts Payable plus Accrued Expenses plus Deposits plus 
the Current Portion of Long Term Debt.
Current Ratio: The ratio o f current assets to current liabilities.
Failed Firm: A firm that has filed for bankruptcy protection.
Fixed Charges: Interest expense plus interest on capitalized leases plus rent 
payments.
Multiple Discriminant Analysis: A statistical analysis technique for distinguishing 
among defined groups by developing a linear combination o f discriminating independent 
variables. Inputs are variables that discriminate between the groups. The analysis 
defines each group as a vector o f attributes that constitute a density function. The process 
maps the multi-dimensional characteristics o f the density function o f the population’s
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attributes onto a one-dimensional measure by forming a linear combination o f  the 
attribute variables along some axis. The purpose of the analysis is to derive relationships 
that minimize the variances within a group while maximizing the variances between 
groups.
Naïve determination: The likelihood of predicting an outcome without any 
knowledge o f the variables.
Non-failed firms: Firms that have not filed for bankruptcy protection.
Operating Income: Revenues less operating expenses.
Quick Assets: The sum o f cash plus net receivables.
Type One Errors: Classifying a failing firm as non-failing. These are generally 
considered the more serious errors for investors or lenders, as investments could be made 
which otherwise might not have been made.
Type Two Errors: Classifying a non-failing firm as failing.
Unclassified Results: When the score a firm obtains in a bankruptcy prediction 
model does not predict either failure or non-failure. Altman termed this the “zone o f 
ignorance” (Altman, 1968). Indicates the need to look at other factors.
Univariant Analysis: The technique o f looking at only one variable at a time to 
explain a result. Assumes implicitly that all other variables are equal. This is the method 
used by Beaver to analyze financial ratios and develop values that indicated the ratio 
level to be expected in a failed or a non-failed firm.
Working Capital: Current Assets less Current Liabilities.
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Test o f results
One possible outcome of the study would be that none o f the three models will be 
able to predict business failure any better than a naïve determination. An alternative 
outcome would be that one or more o f  the models are better than naïve prediction of 
business failure.
Organization of paper
Chapter Two traces the history o f financial statement analysis and bankruptcy 
prediction studies. Each o f the major bankruptcy studies is reviewed and analyzed, 
comparing the alternative techniques that have been employed.
Chapter Three describes the sample selection process and the analytical process of 
testing each o f the selected models. The collection o f financial information and the 
computation o f the ratios to be used in the models are described.
Chapter Fom presents the results o f the data collection and the testing o f each of 
the models. Comparisons o f the results o f  the tests for each model are presented and the 
tests are compared for predictive ability.
Chapter Five summarizes the results o f the tests and conclusions about the 
applicability o f the existing tests to the casino industry. Oppormnities for additional 
research and future studies are also presented.
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction
The literature review will provide a brief history and background o f  financial ratio 
analysis. Each o f the models that will be used in this study will be discussed 
individually. The literature review will also include a general review o f  other prediction 
models and o f  research that has been done in the field o f  bankruptcy prediction.
Backgroimd o f financial ratio analysis 
In 1900, Thomas F. Woodlock published a classic analysis o f  the railroad 
business. The Anatomv o f a Railroad Report. This report discussed such financial 
measures as “the percentage o f operating expenses to gross earnings”, “the ratio o f fixed 
charges to net income” and “the relative proportion which the funded debt and stock o f a 
company should bear to the actual cost o f  the property”. In regard to current position, 
Woodlock said, “In general, current items on each side o f the account should at least 
fairly offset each other, year by year.” In his 1911 The Principles o f Bond Investment. 
Lawrence Chamberlain used W oodlock’s ratio o f  operating expenses to gross earnings, 
calling it the “operating ratio” (Myer, 1939, p. 6-7).
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The need for a measurable method of making credit and investment decisions was 
the primary reason for the initial development of financial ratio analysis. “Analysis of 
financial ratios began in the early 1900’s with the development o f the current ratio and 
the creation o f a benchmark level for an acceptable relationship” (Beaver. 1966, p. 71). 
“Other ratios were developed in the I890’s, but this ratio, the current ratio, was to have a 
more significant and long lasting impact upon financial statement analysis than any other 
ratio.” (Korrigan, 1968).
A classic report issued in 1919 to the Federal Reserve Bank, “Study o f  Credit 
Barometrics”, by an employee o f  a Detroit bank, Alexander Wall, used seven different 
financial ratios from a thousand firms to establish a norm for analysis. (McGurr, 1996, p. 
10). In the article Wall criticized bankers who based their decisions on the current ratio 
alone. He maintained that to get a complete picture o f  the financial condition o f  a firm 
other relationships should be used as a check on the current ratio, (Myer, 1939, p. 12).
Smdies conducted in the 1930’s found that failing firms had significantly different 
financial ratios than non-failing firms (Altman, 1968, p.590). Arthur Winakor and 
Raymond Smith published studies for the University o f Illinois in 1930 and 1935 that 
analyzed trends in financial ratios o f  failed firms. They fotmd that the most accurate and 
consistent indicator o f failure was the ratio of working capital to total assets. (Horrigan, 
1968, p. 288-289).
Paul Fitzpatrick in his 1931 study. Symptoms o f Industrial Failure, smdied trends 
in thirteen ratios over a period o f three years for twenty failed and nineteen non-failed 
companies. He found that all o f  his ratios predicted failure to some extent, but the ratio
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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o f net profit to net worth, the ratio o f  net worth to debt and the ratio of net worth to fixed 
assets were the best predictors. (Horrigan, 1968, p. 289).
In 1942, Charles Merwin published a study. Financing Small Corporations: In 
Five Manufacturing Industries. 1926-36. He analyzed trends in ratios over a six-year 
period for “continuing and discontinuing” firms, comparing mean ratios for the 
discontinued firms against the average ratio values for the continuing firms. His 
conclusion was that three ratios accurately predicted failure, net working capital to total 
assets, net worth to debt and the current ratio. According to Horrigan, “Merwin’s study 
was the first really sophisticated analysis o f ratio predictive power.” (Horrigan, 1968, 
p.290).
William H. Beaver did a classic study using univariate analysis to examine the 
ability o f financial ratios to predict business failure in 1966. According to Edward 
Altman, this study “set the stage for the multivariate attempts, by this author and others, 
which followed.” (Altman, 1993, p. 181). Horrigan said, “This study will undoubtedly 
become a landmark for future analysis in ratio analysis.” (Horrigan, 1968, p. 291).
William H. Beaver, 1966
Beaver first selected a set o f  thirty existing financial ratios that he felt were the 
best measures o f  a firm’s health. He then grouped these ratios into six groups according 
to what they measured. The six groups were cash flow ratios, net income ratios, debt-to- 
total assets ratios, liquid assets to total assets ratios, liquid assets to current debt ratios 
and tumover ratios. The ratios studied are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1
Beaver’s List o f  Ratios Tested
Cash Flow Ratios Liquid Asset to Current Debt Ratios
I. Cash flow to sales 1. Cash to current liabilities
2. Cash flow to total assets 2. Quick assets to current liabilities
3. Cash flow to net worth 3. Current ratio
4. Cash flow to total debt Turnover Ratios
N et Income Ratios 1. Cash to sales
1. Net income to sales 2. Accounts receivable to sales
2. Net income to total assets 3. Inventory to sales
3. Net income to net worth 4. Quick assets to sales
4. Net income to total debt 5. Current assets to sales
Debt to Total Asset Ratios 6. Working capital to sales
1- Current habilities to total assets 7. Net worth to sales
2. Long-term liabihties to total assets S. Total assets to sales
3. Current -r long-term liabihties 9. Cash to expenditures for operations
to total assets 10. Defensive assets to expenditures
4. Current + long-term liabilities + for operations
preferred stock to total assets 11. Defensive assets minus current
Liquid Assets to Total AssetRatios habilities to expenditures for
1. Cash to total assets operations.
2. Quick assets to total assets
3. Current assets to total assets
4. Working capital to total assets
(Beaver, 1966, p. 78).
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These ratios were selected based on three criteria. First the ratio had to generally 
be considered, by the financial literature, to be reflective o f the crucial relationships o f a 
firm’s condition. He cautioned that the popularity o f  a ratio did have a drawback, in that, 
“the most popular ratios will become those most manipulated by management (an activity 
known as window dressing) in a manner that destroys their utility” (Beaver, 1966, pp. 79- 
80).
The second criterion was that the ratio had performed well in one o f  the previous 
studies of bankrupt companies. The third criterion was that the ratio be defined in terms 
o f a cash-flow concept. Beaver felt that “cash-flow ratios offer much promise for 
providing ratio analysis with a unified firamework...” (Beaver, 1966, p. 80). Satisfaction 
o f  any o f the criteria was sufficient for inclusion in the study. In order to have each of the 
ratios provide as much additional information as possible; Beaver excluded any ratio that 
was a “transformation” of another ratio that was already selected.
Beaver’s model was based on four propositions, all else being equal. First that the 
more net liquid assets a firm has, the smaller the probability of failure. Second that the 
larger the net cash flow from operations, the smaller the probability o f  failure. Third that 
the larger the amount o f debt o f  the company, the greater the probability of failure. 
Finally that the larger the amount o f liquid assets required to fund operating expenditures, 
the greater the probability o f failure.
He used these propositions to test the predictive ability of the ratios. Using a set 
o f  79 failed companies and a matched set o f  79 non-failed companies; he calculated each 
o f  the thirty ratios. His results showed that, “The difference in the mean values is in the 
predicted direction for each ratio in all o f  the five years before failure. Failed firms not
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only have lower cash flow than non-failed firms but also a smaller reserv ’̂oir o f  liquid 
assets. Although the failed firms have less capacity to meet obligations, they tend to 
incur more debt than do the non-failed firms” (Beaver, 1966, p. 80).
He found that the data was very consistent and that it suggested that there is a 
difference in the ratios o f failed firms and non-failed firms. This was consistent with 
earlier studies. Fitzpatrick had published a study o f nineteen pairs o f failed and non- 
failed firms in 1932, which indicated repeated differences in the ratios for at least three 
years prior to failure. Winakor and Smith in a 1935 study had found deterioration in the 
mean values o f failed firms for ten years prior to failure, with the rate o f  deterioration 
increasing as failure approached. These were the same results observed by Charles L 
Merwin in his 1942 study, (Beaver, 1966, pp. 81-82).
Having demonstrated that there was a difference in the ratios, Beaver wanted to 
answer the question o f  how large the difference was. To accomplish this he then 
determined the relative frequency distribution of each ratio for each group, failed and 
non-failed. Using these distributions, he was able to identify the ratio value at which the 
likelihood o f  the firm being classified in the appropriate company group (failed or non- 
failed) was high and the likelihood of the firm being classified in the wrong company 
group was low, for each o f the ratios he tested.
The six ratios that had the lowest classification error rate were cash flow to total 
debt, net income to total assets, total debt to total assets, working capital to total assets, 
current ratio and the no-credit interval ratio. The best performing ratio was cash flow'’ to 
total debt, which had a classification error o f 13% in the year prior to failure. The next 
best performing ratio was net income to total assets.
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Beaver concludes that the predictive ability o f certain financial ratios, particularly 
cash flow to total debt provide useful information in assessing the likelihood of a firm 
failing. However, he acknowledges that further research using the combination of several 
ratios or changes in ratios might provide better predictive information. (Beaver, 1966 & 
1968).
Edward I. Altman. 1968
The first study to look at the effect o f using a combination o f financial ratios to 
predict business failure was done by Edward I. Altman in 1968 (Altman, 1968). Altman 
used a statistical technique known as multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) to analyze 
the ratios o f the groups o f failed and non-failed firms in his study. Essentially what this 
technique does is to derive a formula through a regression technique whose answer will 
assign a firm to the proper group, failed or non-failed, with the least amount o f error in 
classification. The formula consists of the ratios, which are the independent variables, 
and tlie coefficients o f  those variables that are derived by the analysis. The equation that 
Altman developed produced what he called a “Z Score”, which is still widely accepted as 
an indication or a firm’s bankruptcy potential.
To choose the ratios to be used in the study, Altman began with a set o f  twenty- 
two variables that had either been found to be significant indicators o f  failure in previous 
studies or which he felt might be significant. Starting with a sample o f  33 failed and 33 
non-failed firms, Altman tested the predictive ability of various combinations o f  ratios.
Using these ratios, Altman went through several procedures to finalize his 
formula. One o f the procedures was the creation o f  alternative functions, an evaluation of
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the statistical significance o f each fiinction and a determination o f the relative 
contribution o f  each ratio. He also evaluated the ratios for correlation or collinearity with 
each other.
From his analysis, Altman ended up with a  function that used only five o f  the 
ratios. It actually turned out that none o f  these five ratios were among the ones which, 
when measured by themselves, were the most significant in predicting bankruptcy. 
Model 1 is Altman’s final discriminant function.
Model 1
Altman Z-Score Multiple Discriminant Analysis Model 
Z =  .012Xi + .014X2 + .033X3 + .006X4 + .999X5
Where X; =  Working capital/Total assets 
X2 =  Retained eamings/Total assets 
X 3 = Earnings before interest and taxes/Total assets 
X 4 = Market value equity/Book value o f total debt 
X 5  = Sales/Total Assets 
Z = Overall Index 
(Altman, 1968, p. 594).
There are understandable rationales behind the predictive ability o f each o f  the 
ratios. The working capital to total assets ratio measures the firm’s liquid assets relative
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to its total capitalization. A firm experiencing consistent operating losses will usually 
have a shrinking proportion of current assets relative to its total assets.
The retained earnings to total assets ratio measures cumulative profitability. 
Since the retained earnings account is a cumulative account, younger firms will have had 
less time to build it up. This creates a bias against younger firms, which is consistent 
with the reality that the incidence o f failure is higher in a firm’s early years.
The earnings before interest and taxes to total assets ratio is a measure o f the 
firm’s productive use of its assets. Insolvency occurs when a firm’s liabilities exceed the 
value o f its assets. Since earning ability is in fact the true measure of the value o f the 
firm’s assets, this ratio provides a basis for assessing the earning ability.
The market value o f equity to book value o f total debt ratio shows the level that 
the firm’s value can decline before its liabilities exceeds its assets. The fifth ratio, sales 
to total assets measures management’s ability to deal with competition.
To evaluate the effectiveness o f the model, Altman had to group the results o f the 
model to determine the average score for each group, which then became the point 
against which each firm’s score could be compared to determine its group membership. 
The firm would be assigned to the group whose mean was closest to its score.
To evaluate the effectiveness o f  the model, Altman used what he called an 
“accuracy-matrix”; set up as follows:
Predicted Group Membership 
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt
Bankrupt H M,
Non-Bankrupt M% H
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The H’s stand for correct classifications (Hits) and the M's stand for 
misclassifications (Misses). M, represents Type 1 errors and M i represents Type 2 
errors. The sum of the correct hits divided by the total number o f  firms being classified 
gives tlie per cent o f  firms correctly classified. This percentage is similar to the 
coefficient o f  determination (R^) in regression analysis, which measures the per cent o f 
the variation of the dependent variable explained by the independent variables. (Altman. 
1968, p. 599).
When the original sample o f  failed and non-failed firms were tested using this 
formula, the overall classification error rate one year prior to failure was 5%. Secondary 
samples used to test the accuracy o f the model also validated the accuracy o f the model.
To make the model usable without having to replicate the study for each 
application, Altman further studied the results o f his initial tests and derived cut-off 
values that would provide a basis for classification. The cut-off values Altman 
established was that all firms with Z scores less than 1.81 were failed, all firms with Z 
scores greater than 2.99 were non-failed and Z scores greater than 1.80 but less than 3.00 
were in a “zone o f ignorance” or gray area.
In his conclusions, Altman said, “A limitation o f the study is that the firms 
examined were all publicly held manufacturing corporations, for which comprehensive 
financial data were obtainable, including market price quotations. An area for future 
research, therefore, would be to extend the analysis to relatively smaller asset-sized firms 
and unincorporated entities where the incidence o f business failure is greater than with 
larger corporations.” (Altman, 1968, p. 609).
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Edward B. Deakin, 1972 
Deakin’s study combined the research o f Beaver and Altman into a single model. 
His perception was that while Beaver’s method had a superior predictive ability, 
Altman’s approach was intuitively more appealing. Using the fourteen ratios from 
Beaver’s study that best predicted failure, Deakin used the same MDA approach that 
Altman had used to derive a linear function that weights and combines the ratios in order 
to maximize the difference between the failed and non-failed groups.
In replicating the Beaver study, Deakin used a smaller sample, 32 failed firms 
instead o f 79, and took the data from a different time period, 1964 to 1970 instead of 
1954 to 1964. He also ranked the values of the ratios and then selected a cut-off point for 
each ratio that would minimize the occurrence o f misclassification errors. He compared 
his results to Beaver’s and found that the results “would tend to confirm Beaver’s 
observations.” (Deakin, 1972, p .169).
Deakin also performed a test to determine the correlation o f the predictive ability 
o f the ratios, called the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient test. This test 
showed “a rather high correlation o f relative predictive ability o f the various ratios.” 
(Deakin, 1972, p. 169).
The correlation coefficient in the third year before failure, while still significant, 
was 20 to 30 points lower than the other years. Through an analysis o f  the financial 
statement items that were used to calculate the ratios, Deakin concluded that the failed 
firms tended to expand rapidly in the third or fourth years prior to failure. This expansion 
was financed by increased debt and preferred stock rather than from fimds provided by 
operations or additional common stock. Subsequently the firms were unable to generate
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sufficient increases in sales and net income to repay this bigger debt load, therefore 
causing them to lose assets.
Deakin’s MDA yielded relationships for each of five years preceding failure. 
MTiile some of the ratios showed a low contribution to the function, he found that leaving 
out any o f  the fourteen ratios increased the number o f  classification errors significantly. 
Rather than establishing a cut-off score, as Altman had done, Deakin classified firms 
according to their score’s deviation from the mean score for each group.
Despite an error rate o f  less than 5% in the three years prior to failure, Deakin’s 
original model was criticized for having different models for each year (Altman, 1993, p. 
227). Expanding on a technique used by Robert Libby in his 1975 study of the 
usefulness o f accounting ratio information (Libby, 1975), Deakin revised his model.
Using principal-components analysis, Libby had identified five independent 
sources o f  variation in the fourteen ratios used in Deakin’s original study. . His reduced 
set o f  ratios accurately classified slightly better for one data sample and slightly worse for 
another sample. He then provided the reduced set o f five of Deakin’s ratios to a group of 
loan officers to test how well they would classify the failed and non-failed firms using 
only that information. His test showed that the bank officers used the information 
correctly and that the classification based on the information was superior to random 
classification.
Deakin developed a new model based on the five ratios identified by Libby. The 
model was tested against his original sample, as well as an additional sample o f 31 firms 
that failed during 1970 and 1971 and another sample o f 47 firms that failed during the 
period 1972 to 1974. For the last sample, the model correctly predicted 39 o f the failures.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
misclassifîed one firm and identified seven companies as in need of further investigation, 
two years prior to failure, (Deakin, 1977, p 84).
Classification into the failed group or the non-failed group was based on the 
relative distance o f its index firom the average o f the failing and non-failing groups. 
Deakin did not specify cutoff values or ranges o f non-determinability in his study. 
However, from the information he did provide about his results it is possible to estimate 
cutoff values. Deakin provided the results o f the calculation o f the group mean for each 
ratio. Using these means to solve the linear and the quadratic equations it is possible to 
determine a solution for each equation for each group’s mean values. The values that 
result from solving the linear equations are -1.381 for failed firms and 4-1.053 for non- 
failed firms. The values for the quadratic formula are -37.84 for failed firms and -54.24 
for non-failed firms. Using these values however does not provide a zone o f  ignorance.
If a firm’s score is closer to the failed group, it is classified as failed, if  it is closer to the 
non-failed group it is classified as non-failed. In order to resolve any differences between 
the two tests, Deakin used the decision rule that when both o f  the tests showed that the 
firm was failing or non-failing, the firm was so classified. I f  the two tests classified the 
firm differently, the firm fell into the “investigate further” category. Deakin’s business 
failure prediction formulas are shown in Model 2.
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Model 2
Deakin’s Multiple Discriminate Analysis Model 
Linear Equation:
I =  -1.369 + 13.855X, + O.O6OX2 -  0.60 IX3 + 0.396X* + 0 .194Xs 
Quadratic Equation:
1 = 1 . 7 8 -  8.242X, -  7O.O6X 1- -  3 1.57X 2 -  5.65XtXz -  22.06X2' +
12.93X3 +  20.49X1X3 + 50.82X2X3 -  204.7X3- -  5.79X» 4- 
0.68X1X4 -  2.O6X2X4 -  1.0X3X4 -  .88X4' - .42X5 - .57X1X5 -  
1.46X 2X 5 -F 2.5X3X5 -  .34X 4X 5 +  .17X 5- 
Where I = Overall Index
Xi = Net Income/Total Assets 
X2 = Current Assets/Total Assets 
X3 = Cash/Total Assets 
X4 = Current Assets/Current Liabilities 
X5 = Sales/Current Assets 
(Deakin, 1977, p. 79).
Altman also produced a model using both the linear and quadratic approach. This 
new model uses seven ratios that are different from the five used in his first model. The 
seven ratios measure return on assets, stability o f earnings, debt-service, cumulative 
profitability^ liquidity, capitalization and size. The new model yields what Altman terms 
a Zeta score that produces superior accuracy to the old model in classifying firms and has 
received generally high reviews in financial literature. However, the model carmot be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
21
independently utilized for testing, as Altman has not released the details o f  the model. 
He has a firm that markets the use o f the model for testing firms, (Altman, 1993, 207- 
221).
Marc Blum and Robert Edmister conducted two other studies that are often 
included in financial literature concerning business failure prediction. Blum’s 1974 study 
was similar to Altman’s, except he broadened the definition o f failure and he used a 
different set of ratios. Edmister’s study also used multiple discriminant analysis, but his 
study only looked at smaller companies.
Robert O. Edmister, 1972
Edmister’s study was the first to focus on small business failure. He used a 
sample drawn firom Small Business Administration loans. Edmister tested five methods 
o f  ratio analysis on a set o f  19 ratios. All the ratios were chosen from ratios used in prior 
studies by Beaver, Altman and Blum. The first method tested was using the ratio itself as 
a predictor of failure. The premise was that the level o f the ratio itself might be a 
predictor o f  failure. To test his theory, Edmister compared the values o f individual ratios 
to the average ratio o f  other small businesses in the same industry. The comparison 
showed that the failed firms’ ratios were consistently lower.
The second method tested was the accuracy o f a test using a three-year trend in 
the ratios. Only ratio values that went in the same direction all three years were 
considered trends. Upward trends were considered positive and downward trends were 
considered negative. Variables for up-trends and downtrends were assigned a value of
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one if  the ratios exhibited either an upward trend or a downward trend; otherwise those 
variables were assigned a value o f zero.
The third test looked at the combination o f the ratio’s trend and the ratio value. 
The fourth test looked at the three-year average o f the ratios. The fifth test looked at a 
combination o f the industry trend and the industry level o f the ratios, by dividing each 
ratio by the corresponding industry average ratio.
Edmister’s study did not result in an accurate function for data within one year o f 
failure. However, an accurate prediction function was developed using data three years 
prior to failure. This equation is shown below. Model 3.
The study achieved a classification accuracy o f 93%, with a Z-score below .47 
indicating failure, above .53 indicating non-failure and scores between those values being 
a “gray zone” similar to Altman’s. The most significant contribution o f  Edmister’s study 
was the concept o f  using industry averages to calculate standardized ratios and the 
converting of the ratios to dichotomous variables, which added to the significance of the 
results. (Edmister, 1972).
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Model 3
Edmister’s Small Firm Multiple Discriminate Analysis Model.
Z =  0.951 -  0.423X, -  0.293X2 -  0-482X3 + 0.277X,
0.452X5 -  0.352Xo - 0.924X7
Where Z =  Overall Index
Xi =  1 i f  funds flow/current liabilities < 0.05
-  0 otherwise
X2 = 1 if  equity/sales < 0.07
=  0 otherwise
X 3  = 1 if  (net working capital/sales)/industry average ratio < -0.02
=  0 otherwise
X 4  = 1 if  (current liabilities/equity)/industry average ratio < 0.48
= 0 otherwise
X5 = 1 if  (inventory/sales)/industry average ratio <  0.04 and
trends upward 
=  0 otherwise
X& = 1 if  quick ratio/industry average < 0.34 and trends
downward 
= 0 otherwise
X? = 1 if  quick ratio/industry average trends upward
=  0 otherwise
(Edmister, 1972, p. 1487-1488).
Marc Blum, 1974
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Blum’s definition o f failure went beyond looking at just bankrupt firms. He also 
included firms that could not pay their debts when due and firms that had entered into an 
agreement to reduce debts. Using this definition, he was able to obtain a data set that 
contained 115 failed and 115 non-failed companies from the years 1954 to 1968.
As a framework for his study, Blum used a set o f six propositions for predicting 
failure that was very similar to the set o f  propositions that Beaver had used. The first 
proposition was that the smaller the pool o f net liquid assets, the greater is the likelihood 
o f failure. The second proposition was that the smaller the inflow o f  resources from 
operations the more likely the probability o f failure. Third that the larger tlie claims on 
the resources by creditors, the greater the probability o f failure. Fourth that the greater 
the outflow o f funds required by the operation of the business the higher the probability 
o f  failure. Fifth that the more highly variable earnings and claims against resources, as 
shown by outflows to maintain current operations and by obligations to creditors, the 
higher the probability o f failure. Finally the more “failure-prone” the industry locations 
o f a firm’s business activities are expected to be, the higher the likelihood o f  failure.
To measure these propositions Blum grouped twelve ratios into three general 
classifications; liquidity, profitability and variability. He further broke down liquidity 
into short-run liquidity and long-run liquidity, and measured both the flow and the 
position of each.
The ratios he used to measure short-term liquidity were the “quick flow” ratio and 
the ratio o f net quick assets to inventory. The “quick flow” ratio was defined as cash + 
notes receivable +  market securities ■+■ (annual sales 4- 12) 4- (cost o f goods sold — 
depreciation expense + selling and administrative expense + interest) 4- 12. He defines
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net quick assets as cash and equivalents plus accounts and notes receivable less short­
term resource claims.
Long-run liquidity was measured by three ratios, cash flow to total liabilities, net 
worth at fair market value to total liabilities and net worth at book value to total 
liabilities. He used the harmonic mean o f the bounds of the range o f  stock prices during a 
year as the measure of fair market value, in order to eliminate speculative upsurges in 
market value.
Profitability was measured as the rate o f  retum to common stockholders who 
invest for a minimum of six years. Rate o f  retum was the internal rate o f retum 
computed over the six years. Initial investment was defined as the average stock price 
during the first year and cash flows over the period were defined as dividends received 
plus a presumed sale at the end o f the six years in an amount equal to the average stock 
price for the sixth year.
Blum’s inclusion o f measures o f variability was the most extreme departure from 
the conventional analyses. He used six ratios to determine variability and trend of 
resource inflow and to determine the variability o f his short-term liquidity indicator -  net 
quick assets to inventory. For both net income and for the net quick assets to inventory 
ratio he computed the standard deviation over each year, trend breaks and slope. Trend 
breaks were defined as a decline in either net income or the ratio from one year to the 
next. Slope is the trend line fitted to the observations using the least-squares method.
Blum reported a 93-95 percent predictive accuracy for his model in the first year 
before failure. He found, like Beaver had, that cash flow/total debt was the best predictor 
ratio. He also developed functions using raw accoimting data which had a better
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predictive accuracy than the models using ratios, but he offered no explanation for this, 
suggesting the need for additional research. He also suggested that his study indicated 
that the use o f  non-traditional ratios and non-traditional approaches to looking at ratios 
might yield more discriminating results. Blum did not publish his actual formulas for 
failure prediction, and none o f  the other studies reviewed attempted to present a formula. 
(Blum, 1974).
James A. Ohlson, 1980 
There have been several other studies that have attempted to improve on the 
ability to predict financial failure. The primary distinctions between these studies have 
been the method o f selecting the ratios to be used, the statistical technique used to 
evaluate the relationship o f the variables, the method o f  selecting the data sample and the 
types o f businesses being reviewed.
In 1980, James Ohlson developed a model using the logit technique that was later 
to be used by Zavgren in her 1985 study. Ohlson cited three primary problems with prior 
studies that had been done using the more popular MDA technique. First he objected to 
the statistical requirements imposed on the distributional properties of the ratios. Among 
these requirements were that the variance-covariance relationships o f the ratios had to be 
the same for both groups and that the ratios had to be normally distributed.
Ohlson also felt that the use o f  a score, which is the output o f  the MDA approach, 
was only a ranking method, and did not provide the opportunity for interpretation. 
Finally, he did not feel that the use o f the procedure o f matching failed and non-failed 
firms provided any benefit to an analysis. He felt that, “The use o f use o f conditional
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logit analysis, on the other hand, essentially avoids all the problems discussed with 
respect to MDA.” (Ohlson, 1980, p. 112).
In addition to his preference for the logit analysis technique, Ohlson also objected 
to the data used in prior studies. He felt that by using financial statement information 
from Moodv’s Manual, the source for most prior studies, no consideration had been given 
to the dates that information was available to the public. He noted that all the prior 
studies had assumed that the information was available as o f the date o f the financial 
statements, which is o f course not the case. To overcome this limitation, he used SEC 
reports that were dated.
According to Ohlson, “No attempt was made to select predictors on the basis of 
rigorous theory. To put it mildly, the state o f art seems to preclude such an approach.” 
(Ohlson, 1980, p. 118).
Ohlson chose nine ratios for his analysis, based on “simplicity”. Five of the ratios 
were ones often cited in the literature; total liabilities divided by total assets, working 
capital divided by total assets, current liabilities divided by current assets, net income 
divided by total assets and funds provided by operations divided by total liabilities. He 
also used size o f  the firm as defined by the equation: log(total assets/GNP price-level 
index).
He also used two variables that were defined as decision variables. One o f these 
variables compared total liabilities to total assets, assigning a value of one if liabilities 
exceed assets and zero otherwise. The other assigned a value o f one if net income was 
negative for the two years prior to failure and zero otherwise. The final factor measured
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the change in net income. The change was determined using the following formula: (Nit 
—  N lt-i)/ 1 Nit I  + I NIt-i 1 ), where Nit is net income for the most recent period.
While Ohlson’s results were not as good as Altman’s or Deakin’s, he concluded 
that his methodology was more sound. He also reached some other interesting 
conclusions from his study. He found that size was the important predictor in his model, 
with financial structure being the next. Ohlson’s model is shown in Model 4.
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Model 4
Ohlson’s Logistic Regression Model.
Y i=  - 1.3 2 - 0 .0407X 1+ 6.03X2- 1.43X3 + 0.0757X4 
2.37X5 -  1.83X6 + 0.285X7- 1.72X3 - 0.521X9 
And
P = (1 +  exp{-Yi}’') so that Y[ = log[P/(l-P)]
Where P = Overall Probability o f Failure
Xi =  log (Total Assets/GNP price-level index)
X2 = Total Liabilities/Total Assets 
X 3  = Working Capital/Total Assets 
X4 = Current Liabilities/Current Assets 
X 5  = Net Income/Total Assets 
Xô = Funds from Operations/Total Liabilities 
X 7  = 1 if  net income was negative for the last two years 
= 0 otherwise 
Xg =  1 if  total liabilities > total assets 
= 0 otherwise
Xg = (Nit — NIt-i)/1 Nit I +  I NIt-i I ), where Nit is net income for the most recent 
period.
(Ohlson, 1980, p. 118-119).
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Rose and Giroux, 1984 
Peter Rose and Gary Giroux developed a model in their 1984 study that used 
ratios that had not been used in previous studies. They developed 130 new ratios and 
tested a set o f 92 firms, 46 failed and 46 non-failed. Their analysis showed that 34 o f 
these ratios showed significant differences between the two groups.
They combined these 34 ratios with 27 ratios that had been used in other 
bankruptcy prediction studies. The ratios were then used in a MDA procedure that 
resulted in a model using 18 o f the ratios. O f these 18 ratios, 13 were ones that had not 
been used in prior models.
The study developed both a linear prediction equation and a quadratic prediction 
equation. The overall classification accuracy o f their model was 92%. The linear 
equation accurately classified the firms firom 97.4% to 88% over the seven-year period o f 
the study. The quadratic equation’s accuracy ranged from 86.7% to 74.5%. While the 
results were not consistent enough to make the model a more reliable predictor than 
either the Altman model or the Deakin model, there were some findings that could 
influence futiure studies.
The performance of the new ratios they used indicates that creative ways o f 
choosing ratios could improve the accuracy o f new models. Their study also showed that 
the quadratic function had less variance than the linear function, perhaps indicating the 
need to include a quadratic equation in future studies (which Zavgren did in her study). 
The actual equation developed by Rose and Giroux was not presented in their study, only 
the results. (Rose & Giroux, 1984).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
Christine V. Zavgren, 1985 
Zavgren used a different statistical analysis technique than Altman and Deakin 
used. She used a technique called logit. Logit, like multiple discriminant analysis, is a 
multi-variant technique that considers all the predictive factors in a problem taken 
simultaneously. Unlike MDA, logit weighs each o f the variables in such a way that the 
formula generates a probability o f classification o f  the total set o f  weighted variables into 
one o f two separate groups. MDA generates a linear relationship whose solution will 
maximize the difference between two possible classifications.
Zavgren chose the ratios to be used in her study based on a 1973 study by 
Pinches, Mingo and Camthers that used factor analysis to identify the most appropriate 
grouping o f factors affecting a firm’s financial position and financial performance. The 
seven areas their study showed as the most critical were retiun on investment, capital 
intensiveness, inventory intensiveness, financial leverage, receivables intensiveness, 
short-term liquidity and cash position, (Bukovinsky, 1993, p. 47).
Using 48 separate ratios, Zavgren selected the seven ratios that provided the best 
measure for each o f  the seven factors. The seven ratios were total income to total capital, 
sales to net plant, inventory to sales, debt to total capital, receivables to inventory, quick 
assets to current liabilities and cash to total assets. Zavgren’s final formula is shown in 
Model 5.
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Model 5
Zavgren’s Logistic Regression Model.
Y i=  0.23883 +0.00486X, + 0 .001110X2 -O.OOIO8X3-O.O435K 1
0.01583X5+0.03074X6-0.1078X7 
Where Yf = Overall Probability o f Failure
X[ = Net Income/Total Equity
X2 = Total Sales/Net Plant
X3 = Total Inventory/Total Sales
X4 = Total Liabilities/Total Equity
X 5  = Total Receivables/Total Inventory
Xô = Quick Assets/Current Liabilities
X 7  = Total Cash/Total Assets
(Zavgren, 1985, p. 24, 29).
According to Zavgren, the expected results o f her study were not supported by the 
analysis. The model she developed had less accurate results than the Altman model or 
the Deakin model. Using probabilities as a financial risk measure in the pattern o f the 
financial attributes and the information provided the primary significance o f  her study. 
(Zavgren, 1983).
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Cash flow models
Prior to the issuance by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) o f 
Statement o f  Financial Accounting Standards No. 95. Statement o f Cash Flows, in 1987, 
consistent information concerning actual cash flow was generally not available. The 
studies conducted prior to 1987 generally used a proxy for cash flow, net income plus 
depreciation, for their ratios that required a cash flow factor. In addition to ignoring the 
impact o f  changes in other current assets and changes in current liabilities on cash flow 
from operations, the use o f net income plus depreciation also leaves out the funds 
provided/used in financing and investing activities. Measures o f  actual cash flow were 
used in several bankruptcy studies during the 1980’s. (Bukovinsky, 1993).
Unfortunately, the results o f  the cash flow based studies showed very little 
incremental value to traditional accmal based prediction models (Altman, 1984). 
Although cash flow is considered in many o f the traditional bankruptcy prediction 
models, using information from accrual statements provide adequate information.
In the FASB Statement o f Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 an objective o f 
financial accounting was said to be the providing to decision-makers o f useful 
information to assess the amount, timing and uncertainty o f future cash flows. The FASB 
and accounting academics agree that accrual accounting provides the best information 
about a firm’s current and future performance (Shroff, 1998).
Casey & Bartczak, 1984 & 1985
In their first study, Casey and Bartczak used a sample o f 60 companies that filed 
for bankruptcy from the period 1971-1982 and matched them with 230 non-failed
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companies. For each o f  these companies they computed three variables, operating cash 
flow, operating cash flow divided by current liabilities and operating cash flow divided 
by total liabilities.
Their conclusion was, “that none o f the variables could discriminate between the 
boiikxupt and non-bankrupt companies with reasonably good accuracy. In fact, overall 
accuracy for operating cash flow was only slightly better than chance (50%) for the first 
and second years before failure and was worse than chance for the remaining years.” 
(Casey & Bartczak, 1984, p.64).
In a letter to the editor of the Harvard Business Re\new, Edward Altman 
commented on Casey & Bartczak’s study. “Casey and Bartczek are absolutely correct in 
their assertion that OCF or its variation measures are poor predictors o f  insolvency, either 
by themselves or as parts o f a multivariate model o f the type that I have been discussing 
ever since the original Z-score approach for bankruptcy prediction was developed. 
Indeed, my own skepticism about liquidity measures in general and cash flow variables in 
particular has caused me to almost eliminate them firom consideration.” (Altman, 1984, 
p. 176).
In a follow-up study, Casey and Bartczak tested the effect adding operating cash 
flow information to existing accrual-based models in order to enhance their predictive 
ability. The results again showed that the operating cash flow data do not provide 
incremental predictive power over accrual-based ratios. They suggested that a broader 
definition o f cash flows, like total cash flow might lead to improved classification 
accuracy. (Casey & Bartczak, 1985).
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Gentr\% Newbold & Whitford, 1985 
Using a matched sample o f  33 failed and 33 non-failed companies. Gentry, 
Newbold & Whitford used both MDA and logit techniques to analyze eight funds flow 
variables. The eight variables were funds provided by operations, flows provided by 
changes in working capital, fixed coverage expenses (interest and rent), funds used for 
capital expenditures, dividends, other asset and liability flows and change in cash and 
marketable securities.
Using a probit model to develop a formula that predicts the probability o f failure 
for each o f the firms, they were only able to achieve 79% accuracy in predicting failure 
using their funds flow variables. They also tested the effect o f  combining accrual-based 
ratios to their model. Their conclusion was “that the addition o f cash-based funds flow 
components to the traditional financial ratios used to discriminate between failed and 
non-failed companies results in significantly improved predictive performance.” (Gentry, 
Newbold & Whitford, 1985).
However, according to Bukovinsky, “this conclusion is based only on the 
statistical significance o f the models. The ultimate test o f  the incremental predictive 
ability of the models would involve the use o f the models to classify a sample o f firms 
and to compare the classification accuracies o f the models. No such test o f the 
comparative classification accuracies o f the models was performed.” (Bukovinsky, 
1993).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
36
Aziz & Lawson, 1988 
Aziz and Lawson formally tested the differences between the predictive accuracy 
o f  Altman’s Z and Zeta models, a cash flow based model and a model that combines the 
cash flow based model with Altman’s Z-model. What they found was that in the first 
year before failure the combined model showed better classification accuracy than that 
showed by any o f  the other three models. However, in terms o f  overall accuracy they 
found that the ability to discriminate between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms was about 
the same for all the models.
In terms o f predictive accuracy, the cash flow model and the combined model 
were superior to either the Z-model or the Zeta model, particularly in the second through 
the fifth years before failure. Their conclusion was that while the study showed mixed 
results, it did indicate that cash flow information was important and should be considered 
in future smdies. (Aziz, Emanuel & Lawson, 1988) & (Aziz & Lawson, 1989).
Summary o f literature 
While there are many studies that have been conducted in the field o f  predicting 
business failure and many failure prediction models developed, there is no consensus on 
which model is the best or which variables are the most effective. A limitation on all o f  
the studies has been the lack o f sufficient data to perform extensive testing or satisfactory 
validation procedures. It would seem that more study concerning the causes o f financial 
failure and how these causes might be revealed by financial data would provide insight 
into failure prediction. To date, the models have concentrated on identifying the
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symptoms o f a failed firm, which could be simply a definition o f what a failed firm looks 
like after it has entered into a failure mode, rather than what indicates the cause o f failure.
O f all the models reviewed, none proved consistently more accurate or more 
generally accepted than the models chosen for this study. In addition, many o f the other 
studies did not provide explicit details o f their models, so replicating their study with a 
different sample would not be possible anyway.
A recent study evaluating existing bankruptcy prediction models showed that no 
one model in the existing literature was entirely satisfactory at differentiating between 
bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. The smdy concluded that the different models might 
have different uses and that the challenge for new research is to make full use o f all 
readily available data within a better model o f the bankruptcy process. (Mossman. 1998).
A  review o f financial journals and internet resources for the past four years shows 
that the popularity o f bankruptcy prediction research has declined since the 70’s and 80’s. 
With the exception o f research into possible artificial intelligence applications to 
bankmptcy prediction, no new approaches were discovered.
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Introduction
This study analyzes failed and non-failed casino companies using three traditional 
bankruptcy prediction models in order to evaluate their ability to predict financial failure 
in the casino industry. A possible outcome of the study is that none o f the models will be 
able to accurately predict business failure in the gaming industry. An alternative outcome 
is that at least one o f  the three models will be a reliable predictor o f  business failure in the 
casino industry. Using financial information from failed and fi'om non-failed casinos, the 
ratios needed as independent variables for each of the models will be calculated. These 
ratios are then used to generate a prediction of failure for each o f  the models. The results 
will then be evaluated to assess the accuracy of each model.
Sample selection
The primary limitation o f this study is the availability o f  financial information 
from failed and non-failed casinos. Casino managers and owners are traditionally very 
sensitive to revealing financial information about their operations. The industry was
38
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begun by people whose lives were often shrouded in secrecy and who had very little trust 
o f  anyone outside o f their own organization.
In Nevada, this tradition o f  secrecy has even extended to information provided to 
the state government. Public assess to reported casino financial information in Nevada 
has been limited by law to aggregations that conceal the identity o f  individual properties. 
New Jersey makes more individual property financial information available to the public, 
but this information is primarily operating data, and is not sufficient for the bankruptcy 
prediction models being tested.
With the advent o f  publicly traded casino corporations, the availability o f 
financial data has improved. Publicly traded companies, including publicly traded casino 
companies, are required to file financial information with the SEC. Also any casino that 
has registered debt is required to file the same types o f information. This information is 
available through various sources, including the company armual shareholder reports and 
the SEC information that is compiled on the Disclosure database and on the Edgar 
database, which are both available at the UNLV library. All o f  these sources are utilized 
in this study.
Prior to beginning the search for financial information, it was necessary to 
determine which financials were necessary for the study. Since the number o f casino 
companies that have failed is the smaller group, a list o f  those casinos was developed. 
This list was developed through interviews o f several casino industry experts.
The people interviewed were the senior gaming industry partners for two of the 
leading CPA firms in the casino industry, Steve Comer o f Arthur Anderson and Jeff 
Cooper o f  Bradshaw Smith. The former senior gaming industry parmer o f  Laventhol and
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Honvath, Saul Leonard, who now has his own gaming consulting business in Los 
Angeles was also interviewed. Two bankruptcy trustees, Larry Bertsch, CPA from Las 
Vegas and H. S. Duffy Stanley, Jr. from Biloxi, Mississippi were interviewed. Neil 
Baker, a Ph.D. candidate at UNLV, whose dissertation includes information on bankrupt 
casino/hotels was interviewed. Jason Ader the senior gaming industry analyst for Bear 
Stems and Bruce Turner the senior gaming analyst for Smith. Barney were interviewed. 
Also, Shannon Bybee, Executive Director o f  the UNLV International Gaming Institute, 
and William Dougall, the former president o f  Del Webb Nevada, the Aladdin, the Marina 
and the Claridge casinos.
The final list o f  bankrupt casinos compiled consisted o f  32 casinos. Twelve o f  
tliese casinos were privately owned and were immediately eliminated from the study. 
Information on the remaining firms for the two years preceding their bankruptcy was 
potentially available from the sources identified. At the same time financial information 
on the bankrupt casinos was being located, non-failed casinos that had financial 
information available were also identified and the information accumulated.
The first step in looking for available casino financial information was to review 
the collection o f casino company financial statements in the UNLV Library. Thomas 
Mirkovich, Assistant Collection Development & Management Librarian assembled this 
collection for UNLV’s James R. Dickinson Library over the past few years. Mr. 
Mirkovich initially reviewed casino industry publications to identify corporate casinos 
that might have available financial information. Working with representatives o f 
Disclosure, Inc., he then assembled a collection o f historical financial information from
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SEC reports. Although the collection is somewhat dated and incomplete, it did provide a 
starting point.
UNLV also has two other collections o f  gaming information. The IGT 
Corporation purchased a collection o f gaming literature from a Reno CPA, Gary Royer, 
which is maintained at the College o f Hotel Administration. And the UNLV library has 
also established a collection o f gaming publications. The IGT Special Collection o f 
gaming information and the UNLV library’s special collection o f  gaming information 
both include limited collections o f casino company armual reports for various casino 
companies. These reports provided a limited amoimt o f information.
Finally, SEC records were reviewed for additional information using the Edgar 
and Disclosure databases. The UNLV’s sources o f  historical SEC information do not 
include any reports prior to 1991, which if  available may have provided additional failed 
firms to include in the study.
The reviews yielded financial information on twelve o f the bankrupt casinos for 
the appropriate years. To test the ability o f the models to not predict failure for non­
failed firms, a list o f non-failed casino companies for which there is financial information 
was necessary. Although there are more non-failed casinos than failed casinos, the size 
o f  the sample was hmited to the same number as the failed sample to make the two 
samples comparable. There were 24 non-failed casinos identified during the search that 
had financial information available. Since this is essentially a convenience sample, the 
12 non-failed casinos selected to be included in the study were the ones that most closely 
matched the time period and size o f the failed casinos. An attempt was also made to 
include as broad a cross section o f  casino types and locations as possible with the limited
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size o f the sample. The selection of non-failed casinos did not include any marginally 
successful casinos, which should emphasize the differences between the financial 
strength o f failed and non-failed casinos.
Models used in the study
The models tested in this study are limited to the one developed by Edward I. 
Altman, the one developed by Edward B. Deakin and the one developed by Christine V. 
Zavgren.
The Altman model is generally considered the landmark model in bankruptcy 
prediction; it was the first published study that used multi-variant analysis to study the 
differences between failed and non-failed firms, by using multiple ratios simultaneously. 
The Altman model, which was first published in 1968, is still the most widely used and 
widely quoted bankruptcy prediction model.
The Deakin model is another early multi-variant analysis model that is generally 
cited and used as a standard for evaluating new approaches to bankruptcy prediction. It 
uses different ratios than the Altman model and may produce different results when 
applied to gaming analysis.
The Zavgren model was chosen because it uses a different approach than either 
the Altman or the Deakin model, and may yield different conclusions from those o f the 
other two models.
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Computation o f ratios 
To assure that the ratios used in the models are directly comparable, any reported 
ratios were ignored and the ratios were computed using financial data from the financial 
statements. Reviewing the requirements o f  each o f the models identified the ratios that 
had to be computed. In the three models there is only one ratio that is duplicated, both 
Deakin and Zavgren use Total Cash/Total Assets in their models, all o f  the other ratios 
are unique to each model.
Altman uses the following ratios in his model: Working capital to Total assets. 
Retained earnings to Total assets, Earnings before interest and taxes to Total assets. 
Market value equity to Book value o f total debt and Sales to Total Assets. The one 
variable in the Altman model that is not presented in a company’s financial statements is 
the market value o f the equity. For the casinos that are publicly traded this value will be 
considered to be the closing price o f  the company’s stock times the number of shares 
outstanding as o f the date o f  the financial statements. For the non-public companies the 
book value of the equity will be used as a  proxy for market value. This treatment is not 
consistent with his original model, which only looked at public companies, but is the only 
reasonable alternative.
The Deakin model uses the following ratios: Net income to Total assets. Current 
assets to Total assets. Cash to Total assets. Current assets to Current liabifities and Sales 
to Current assets. All o f  the variables in Deakin’s ratios are available in financial 
statements prepared using Generally Accepted Accounting Principals (GAAP).
The Zavrgen model uses the following ratios: Net income to Total equity. Total 
sales to Net plant. Total inventory to Total sales, Total liabilities to Total equity. Total
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receivables to Total inventory. Quick assets to Current liabilities and Total cash to Total 
assets.
In total there are eleven balance sheet accounts, four income statement accounts 
and market value that will have to be identified from the financial statements in order to 
be able to calculate the ratios in the three models. The balance sheet accounts are total 
assets, total liabilities, total equity, current assets, current liabilities, total receivables, 
total inventory, cash, retained earnings, total debt and total fixed assets. The income 
statement accounts are net income, sales, interest expense and tax expense.
Analysis o f results
Once the variables are identified for each of the companies in the study, the ratios 
for each model are computed. Applying the formula(s) for each model to the ratios yields 
the appropriate score for the firm.
The Altman model will produce one score for each company. In Altman’s 
original study, he determined that all firms with a score o f less than 1.81 were failed and 
that all firms that had a score in excess o f 2.99 were not failed. Scores between 1.81 and 
2.99 were not consistently failed or non-failed and required further investigation. These 
cutoff values will be the same for this study.
The firms will be grouped into the two classifications, failed or non-failed. Using 
the computed scores, each firm within each group will then be put into a secondary group 
that indicates the results o f  the test, failed, non-failed or unclassified. The results will be 
presented in a “prediction accuracy-matrix” format adapted from the accuracy matrix 
format used by Altman to evaluate his study.
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An analysis o f  the predictive ability o f the model can now be evaluated, whether 
the model correctly predicts the firm’s status, fails to predict the firm’s status or is unable 
to predict the firm’s status. The model’s accuracy will be determined based on the 
percentage o f the firms that are correctly classified. Therefore there will be three 
separate measures for accuracy, the percentage o f failed firms classified as failed, the 
percentage o f non-failed firms classified as non-failed and the percentage o f all the firms 
tliat are properly classified.
Since the utility o f the model is determined not only by its accuracy but also by 
the firequency o f each type o f error when the firm is incorrectly classified. Whether one 
type o f  error is considered more severe than another type of error depends on the 
perspective o f the user.
A type one error occurs when a failing firm is incorrectly classified as non-failing. 
This type o f error would be particularly bad for a lender or an investor who is considering 
additional investment in the firm. If the firm is judged as unlikely to fail, investment that 
might otherwise not be made will be at higher risk. While the additional investment 
could actually lower the likelihood o f failure, it is the nature o f the investment that 
changes. The investor should be aware that an investment is a bailout investment as 
opposed to a going concern business investment, when making the decision.
A type two error occurs when a non-failing firm is incorrectly classified as failing. 
The costs of type two errors are primarily opportunity costs. An investor or a lender may 
not make what would be a sound investment in a firm that is not likely to fail. 
Alternatively the cost to the firm o f obtaining investment dollars may be unfairly priced 
due to the inappropriately perceived risk o f  failure. A higher cost o f obtaining fimds or
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the non-availabihty o f needed funds could also change the status of the firm from 
probably non-failing to failing.
The frequency o f  non-classification also impacts the utility of the model. I f  the 
model is unable to predict failure or non-failure, further analysis is required before 
making decisions and no predisposition indication is available. While additional analysis 
is always appropriate before making decisions, the model just does not add any value to 
the analysis if  it does not provide a classification.
Since the study is using matched pair samples, a simple random classification o f  a 
firm as either failed or non-failed would be accurate 50% o f the time. This type o f 
classification is called a naïve selection, and the added utility o f the models being 
evaluated is determined by how much better they predict failure or non-failure than a 
nmve prediction.
The Deakin model has two functions that must be solved for each company, a 
linear function and a quadratic function. Each equation yields a score for each firm.
Using the criteria derived firom Deakin’s study, a score on the linear equation that 
is closer to —1.381 than to 1.053 will be considered failed. Using the midpoint o f  the two 
values as the cutoff means that a score below -0.164 will be considered failed and above 
-0 .164  will be considered non-failed. For the quadratic equation a score closer to -37.84 
than to —54.24 will be considered failed. Again using the midpoint between these two 
values as the cutoff means that a score higher than —46.02 will be considered failed and a 
score lower than -46.02 will be considered non-failed.
For each equation an accuracy matrix will be developed showing the correct 
classifications, the type one errors and the type two errors. In addition, using the decision
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criteria recommended by Deakin, the firms would be classified a third time based oa the 
results o f  the two equations. His criteria were that to be considered failed or not failed a 
company would have to have scores in both models that were the same.
It is the third accuracy matrix that will be used to evaluate the model, since 
Deakin used this as the test to resolve any differences in the models. This means that like 
the Altman model, the Deakin model will have an accuracy percentage, type one errors, 
type two errors and unclassified firms.
The Zavgren model calculates a probability o f failure rather than a score. Thus 
the reliability o f  the model will have be determined in a different manner than the one 
used for the Altman and the Deakin models. In her study, Zavgren presented graphs that 
showed the results o f  the analysis for each of the five years preceding failure. The graphs 
showed the actual failure rates at intervals of computed probability o f  failime. The graphs 
showed that both one year and two years prior to failure, the failed firms had a computed 
probability o f  failure greater than 70% approximately 65% of the time. Non-failed firms 
had a probability o f failure o f  less than 30% approximately 65% o f  the time. Therefore 
for purposes o f  this study, these percentages will be used to determine the accuracy of the 
model, with percentages between 30% and 70% being considered non-classified.
After the accuracy o f each model is determined, the overall results o f each model 
will be compared to determine which model is the better predictor o f failure for the 
casino industry. The results o f  each model will also be evaluated against the results of a 
naïve model.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS AND RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results o f the data collection and the testing o f each o f 
the models. Comparisons o f the results o f  the tests for each model are presented and the 
tests are compared for predictive ability.
Table 2 presents the financial data needed to calculate the ratios to be used in the 
three models being tested for each o f the failed casino companies in the study. Table 3 
presents the financial data for each o f the non-failed casino companies in the study. All 
o f the information was obtained from published financial statements, except a value o f 
one was substituted for any o f the reported numbers that were zero and would have 
resulted in meaningless ratios. The market values did not come from the financial 
statements either. Closing prices o f stock or end-of-the-year high stock prices were 
multiplied by the number o f shares outstanding were used to calculate market value, if  
the information was available. In cases where information was not available, the year- 
end balance o f the equity section (if  positive) of the balance sheet was used to represent 
market value. I f  the equity section had a negative value, a market value o f 1 was 
assigned, using the assumption that the company was not worth enough to pay off its 
creditors.
48
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Table 4 shows the results o f  calculating the ratios to be used in each o f the models 
for the failed casinos in the study. Table 5 shows the results o f calculating the ratios to 
be used in each o f  the models for the non-failed casinos in the study.
The ratios calculated for the Altman models are working capital to total assets, 
retained earnings o total assets, earnings before interest and taxes to total assets, market 
value to total debt and sales to total assets.
The ratios used in the Deakin models are net income to total assets, current assets 
to total assets, cash to total assets, current assets to current liabilities and sales to current 
assets.
The ratios used in the Zavgren models are net income to total equity, total sales to 
net plant, total inventory to total sales, total habilities to total equity, total receivables to 
total inventory, quick assets to current liabilities and total cash to total assets.
Table 6 shows the results o f  calculating the model results for each o f the failed 
casinos in the study. Table 7 shows the results o f  calculating the model results for each 
o f the non-failed casinos in the study.
Table 8 shows the calculated classification of each o f  the failed casinos for each 
o f the three model tests. Table 9 shows the calculated classification o f  each o f  the non- 
failed casinos for each of the three model tests.
Tables 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 summarize the results o f  the tests for each o f  tire two 
groups (failed and non-failed) for each o f the three models, using the Prediction Accuracy 
Matrix format.
The analysis and conclusions o f the model results are presented in the next 
chapter.
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Table 2
Financial Statement Information for Failed Casinos (SOGO)
Arizona Charlies Sally's Grand Claridge
Year 1996 1995 1990 1989 1997 1996
Total Assets 62,357 65,273 66,519 70,110 150.380 164,163
Total Liabilities 71,858 70.215 41.129 24.075 166,193 173.997
Total Equity (9,501) (43)42) 25,390 46.035 (15.813) (9,834)
Current Assets 8,306 13,131 40,087 46,940 37.096 31.753
Current Liabilities 66,836 10,211 14,036 13,602 41,234 39,027
Total Receivables 473 658 14,561 23,659 21,467 19,744
Total Inventory 575 661 12.199 14,107 2,935 3,199
Cash 4.591 5,404 1,012 1 12,424 S.532
Retained Earnings (9,970) (5.411) 18,923 39,690 (20,866) (14,887)
Total Debt 60,022 60.004 26,637 9,434 85,023 85,000
Total Fixed Assets 45.681 48,358 18,306 17.539 32,094 35,188
N et Income (4.559) (4,936) (30,367) (4.166) (5,979) (15.389)
Sales 63,301 57,082 54,509 65,424 192,753 193,311
Interest Expense 7,095 6,574 3,365 2,979 10,567 9.350
Tax Expense - - (9,600) (2.334) - (5.398)
M arket Value 1 1 25,390 46,035 1 1
Debbie Reynolds Four Queens Gold River
Year 1996 1995 1994 1993 1989 1988
Total Assets 9,292 11,929 67,315 71,923 137,730 42.672
Total Liabilities 15,621 12,813 68,979 67,356 133,464 33.026
Total Equity (6,329) (884) (1.664) 4,567 4,266 9.646
Current Assets 1,831 2,504 6.204 7,499 25,882 7.566
Current Liabilities 15,621 12,563 16,709 12,799 15,314 8,643
Total Receivables 985 1,451 742 699 225 174
Total Inventory 541 615 396 202 194 236
Cash 2 324 3,407 5,114 22,267 6.427
Retained Earnings (21,490) (15,026) (63,023) (53,582) (17,579) (12.354)
Total Debt 8,688 8,328 52,081 54,368 118,150 24,303
Total Fixed .Assets 10,586 10,434 28,341 27,168 70,420 34,409
Net Income (6,464) (8,603) (9,441) (2,537) (5,225) 3.796
Sales 6,421 9,790 62,706 66,852 39.911 46.370
Interest Expense 1,554 2,601 9,086 4,256 9,106 2.844
Tax Expense - - - (624) - -
M arket Value 1 1 23,814 51,298 4,266 9,646
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Table 2 (con't)
Financial Statement Information for Failed Casinos (SOOO)
Gold River Palace Resorts International
Year 1995 1994 1995 1994 1993 1992
Total Assets 35,926 96,833 27,685 67.499 575,785 568,950
Total Liabilities 97,132 87,699 65,936 62,230 689,529 586,212
Total Equity (61.206) 9,134 (38.251) 5.269 (113,744) (17.262)
Current Assets 5.9S2 4,809 9,935 13.297 115,419 107.937
Current Liabilities 96,863 82,460 2.632 57,802 550,500 72,500
Total Receivables 457 374 48 49 19,297 25,457
Total Inventory 597 620 1 30 8,664 8.531
Cash 3,600 2.195 8,435 12,212 62,546 56.818
Retained Earnings (83,360) (13.020) (57.698) (14,179) (210,720) (108,556)
Total Debt 269 5,239 63,304 4,429 551,365 460,712
Total Fixed Assets 29.000 91,241 17.256 52,437 447,840 450,816
Net Income (70,340) (5,631) (43,519) (10,316) (102,164) (53.454)
Sales 48,871 56,477 27,593 5,406 439,564 436,934
Interest Expense 6,571 10,673 3,699 1,486 57,244 40.856
Tax Expense - - - - (1.000) 1.348
Market Value 1 9,134 1 5,269 42,834 25.196
Sands - .Atlantic City Santa Fe Stratosphere
Year 1997 1996 1997 1996 1996 1995
Total .Assets 15,752 221,345 216,296 228,656 181,080 433.906
Total Liabilities 158,868 380,552 195,438 196,180 318,522 241.616
Total Equity (143,116) (159,207) 20,858 32,476 (137,443) 192,290
Current Assets 9,381 46,203 22,457 27,085 37.941 104,279
Current Liabilities 106.372 53,063 26,459 25,805 45,983 38,616
Total Receivables 61 10,656 910 1,530 4,575 4,486
Total Inventory 164 4,016 1,248 1,218 2,629 1.697
Cash 6,555 24,991 15,146 17,498 25,237 92.596
Retained Earnings (218,847) (198,283) (51,099) (37,965) (356,814) (7.972)
Total Debt 30,894 322,897 168,979 167,687 272,539 203,000
Total Fixed Assets 1,210 156,887 140,751 148,412 130,000 194,908
Net Income (20,564) (35,566) (11,617) 17,594 (348,843) (4.663)
Sales 263.366 283,640 104,989 148,432 108,739 59,864
Interest Expense 38,246 39,851 22,608 24,422 21,762 11,970
Tax Expense (1,014) (160) 3,821 4,237 - -
Market Value 3,268 8,092 25,149 38,313 41,970 408,617
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Ameristar Argosy Aztar
Year 1995 1994 1993 1992 1996 1995
Total Assets 202,220 125,347 94,635 21,022 1,119,582 1,013,238
Total Liabilities 137.173 68,738 13,683 18.210 680,308 653,579
Total Equity 65,047 56,609 80,952 2,812 439.274 359,659
Current Assets 33,807 14,965 17,626 3,096 113.320 73.134
Current Liabilities 29,400 2,701 12,370 13,975 120238 102,068
Total Receivables 888 615 521 99 41.723 21J25
Total Inventory 2,273 1,538 201 248 7,508 6,591
Cash 14,787 9,169 7,404 2,749 44,131 26,527
Retained Earnings 21,800 13.362 8,844 2,599 44.846 24,922
Total Debt 94,428 38,617 431 3,351 527,006 496,439
Total Fixed Assets 163,217 108,155 53,787 17,112 927,059 853,680
Net Income 8,438 4,220 10,825 15,214 20.639 (4.994)
Sales 123,867 114,353 67,525 58,019 777,472 572,869
Interest Expense 3,958 3,379 800 7,882 58.577 51,052
Tax Expense 5,236 2,426 3,956 338 22,699 5,187
Market Value 145,065 167,970 454,419 15,785 427,500 349.177
Boomtown Boyd Gaming Caesar's
Year 1995 1994 1997 1996 1994 1993
Total Assets 239.198 238,467 1,030,185 953,425 1,018,021 955,719
Total Liabilities 133,953 130,450 838,869 720,168 461,154 482.829
Total Equity 105,245 108,017 191,316 233,257 556.867 472,890
Current Assets 33,714 23,510 95,540 86,816 276,841 241,135
Current Liabilities 24,831 25,270 99,077 95,814 179,301 165,459
Total Receivables 924 1,321 16,946 16,040 71,341 66,041
Total Inventory 2,715 3,016 8,501 6,531 12,986 11,364
Cash 20,775 11,391 55,220 48,980 143,499 108,616
Retained Earnings 1,793 4,670 52,610 130,102 477,766 399,405
Total Debt 106,547 105,140 739,792 590,808 212,556 243,024
Total Fixed Assets 150,955 157,298 744,038 796,093 626,740 616,393
Net Income (2,877) (8,052) (77,492) 28,144 78,361 83,215
Sales 231,767 103,375 819,259 775,857 1,015,766 983,459
Interest Expense 13,434 5,632 61,672 52,360 19,295 26,883
Tax Expense 876 (2,779) (34,025) 20,021 50,194 50,761
Market Value 114,197 175,973 376,835 986,942 1,137,940 .252,543
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 3 (con't)
Financial Statement Information for Non-Failed Casinos (SOOO)
53
Casino America Circus Circus Harvey’s
Year 1997 1996 1997 1996 1994 1993
Total Assets 528,421 226,474 2,729,111 2413,503 229,868 213,462
Total Liabilities 450,448 176,204 1,694,739 968,161 114.934 123,454
Total Equity 77,973 50,270 971,791 1.226,812 123,611 90,008
Current Assets 78,415 27,379 151,849 125,990 26,167 24.910
Current Liabilities 69.538 38,311 129,768 95,532 20,165 16.253
Total Receivables 4,793 1,764 34,434 16,137 2,629 2.789
Total Inventory 1,776 1,030 19,371 20,459 2,890 2.379
Cash 51,846 18,585 69,516 62,704 7,446 1 1,338
Retained Earnings 15,202 36,253 984,363 883,630 94,217 90400
Total Debt 364,617 130,884 1,405,897 715,214 64,895 80,203
Total Fixed Assets 285,234 129,306 1,920,032 1,474,684 192,240 166,419
Net Income (21,051) 1,555 100,733 128,898 5,138 4,809
Sales 375,602 157,963 1,334,250 1,299,596 128,286 132,259
Interest Expense 40,332 15,293 54,681 51,537 3,556 4,559
Tax Expense (1,560) 3,333 63,130 76,861 2,500 2,994
Market Value 392.583 253,102 2,328,985 3,877,775 140,235 102,113
Hollywood Park Lady Luck Mirage
Year 1997 1996 1996 1995 1996 1995
Total Assets 419,029 205,886 223,718 217,281 2,143,490 1,791,713
Total Liabilities 195.729 44,711 200,973 200,675 852,607 582,370
Total Equity 221,354 158,160 6,315 1,937 1,290,883 1,209,343
Current Assets 60,206 40,959 20,584 35,219 236,283 214,816
Current Liabilities 57,317 35,364 19,892 23,702 218,465 174,351
Total Receivables 9,417 7,110 1,276 597 70,196 76,859
Total Inventory 1,633 2,441 1,198 885 27,554 25,601
Cash 24,156 16,408 15,490 22,148 81,908 48,026
Retained Earnings (3,618) (10,775) (25,096) (29,474) 856,215 650,170
Total Debt 132,102 282 181,081 176,973 468,140 248,548
Total Fixed Assets 300,666 130,835 173,119 155,664 1,728,348 1,439,517
Net Income 8,670 (4,249) 6,139 4,461 206,045 163,163
Sales 248,128 143.225 161,707 149,590 1,367,544 1,330,744
Interest Expense 7,302 942 22,170 20,058 31,106 32,799
Tax Expense 5,850 3,459 (69) (401) 112,363 95,313
Market Value 221,354 158,160 73,213 87,855 3,856,516 3,185,550
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Arizona Charlies B ally 's Grand Claridge
Y ear 1996 1995 1990 1989 1997 1996
A ltm an Ratios:
W orking capital/Totai assets -94% 4% 39% 48% -3% -4%
R etained eam ings/Total assets -16% -8% 28% 57% -14% -9%
Earnings B4 in terest &  taxes/Total assets 4% 3% -55% -5% 3% -7%
M arket value/Total defat 0% 0% 95% 488% 0% 0%
Sales/Total assets 102% 87% 82% 93% 128% 118%
D eakin Ratios;
N et income.T'otal assets -7% -8% -46% -6% -4% -9%
C urrent assets/Total assets 13% 20% 60% 67% 25% 19%
Cash/Total assets 7% 8% 2% 0% 8% 5%
C urrent assets/C urrent liabilities 12% 129% 286% 345% 90% 81%
Sales/Current assets 762% 435% 136% 139% 520% 609%
Z avgren Ratios:
N et incom e/Total equ ity 48% 100% -120% -9% 38% 156%
Total sales/Net p lant 139% 118% 298% 373% 601% 549%
Total inventory/Total sales 1% r/o 22% 22% 2% 2%
Total liabiliries/Total equity -756% -1421% 162% 52% -1051% -1769%
Total receivables/Total inventory 82% 100% 119% 168% 731% 617%
Q uick assets/Current liabilities 8% 59% 111% 174% 82% 72%
Total cash/Total assets 7% 8% 2% 0% 8% 5%
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Debbie Reynolds Four Queens Gold River
Year 1996 1995 1994 1993 1989 1988
Altm an Ratios:
W orking capital/Total assets -148% -84% -16% -7% 8% -3%
Retained eamings/Total assets -231% -126% -94% -74% -13% -29%
Earnings B4 interest &  taxes/Total assets -53% -50% -1% 2% 3% 16%
M arket value/Total debt 0% 0% 35% 71% 3% 23%
Sales/Total assets 69% 82% 93% 93% 29% 109%
Deakin Ratios:
Net income/Total assets -70% -72% -14% -4% -4% 9%
Current assets/Total assets 20% 21% 9% 10% 19% 18%
Cash/Total assets 0% 3% 5% 7% 16% 15%
Current assets/Current liabilities 12% 20% 37% 59% 169% 88%
Sales/Current assets 351% 391% 1011% 891% 154% 613%
Zavgren Ratios:
Net income/Total equity 102% 973% 567% -56% -122% 39%
Total sales/Net plant 61% 94% 221% 246% 57% 135%
Total inventory/Total sales 8% 6% 1% 0% 0% 1%
Total liabilities/Total equity -247% -1449% -4145% 1475% 3129% 342%
Total receivables/Total inventory 182% 236% 187% 346% 116% 74%
Q uick assets/Current liabilities 6% 14% 25% 45% 147% 76%
Total cash/Total assets 0% 3% 5% 7% 16% 15%
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Gold River Palace Resorts Inter"!
Year 1995 1994 1995 1994 1993 1992
Altm an Ratios:
W orking capital/Total assets -253% -80% 26% -66% -76% 6%
Retained eam ings/Total assets -232% -13% -208% -21% -37% -19%
Eam ings B4 interest &  taxcs.Total assets -178% 5% -144% -13% -8% -2%
M arket value/Total debt 0% 174% 0% 119% 8% 5%
Sales/Total assets 136% 58% 100% 8% 76% 77%
D eakin Ratios:
Net income/Total assets 115% -62% 114% -196% 90% 310%
Current assets/Total assets 17% 5% 36% 20% 20% 19%
Cash/Total assets 10% 2% 30% 18% 11% 10%
Current assets/Current liabilities 6% 6% 377% 23% 21% 149%
Sales/Current assets 817% 1174% 278% 41% 381% 405%
Zavgren Ratios:
Net income/Total equity 115% -62% 114% -196% 90% 31 0%
Total sales/Net plant 169% 62% 160% 10% 98% 97%
Total inventory/Total sales 1% 1% 0% 1% 2% 2%
Total liabilities/Total equity -159% 960% -172% 1181% -606% -3396%
Total receivables/Total inventory 77% 60% 4800% 163% 223% 298%
Q uick assets/Current liabilities 4% 3% 322% 21% 15% 11 3%
Total cash/Total assets 10% 2% 30% 18% 11% 10%
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 4 (con't)
Financial Ratios for Failed Casinos
57
Sands - Atl Cty Santa Fe Stratosphere
Y ear 1997 1996 1997 1996 1996 1995
A ltm an Ratios:
W orking capital/Total assets -616% -3% -2% 1% -4% 15%
R etained eam ings/Total assets -1389% -90% -24% -17% -197% -2%
Eam ings B4 interest &  taxes/Total assets 106% 2% 7% 20% -181% 2%
M arket value/Total debt 11% 3% 15% 23% 15% 201%
Sales/Total assets 1672% 128% 49% 65% 60% 14%
D eak in  Ratios:
N et incom e/Total assets -131% -16% -5% 8% -193% -1%
C urren t assets/Total assets 60% 21% 10% 12% 21% 24%
Cash/Total assets 42% 11% 7% 8% 14% 21%
C urren t assets/Current liabilities 9% 87% 85% 105% 83% 270%
Sales/C urrent assets 2807% 614% 468% 548% 287% 57%
Zavgren R atios:
N et incom e/Total equity 14% 22% -56% 54% 254% -2%
T otal sales/Net p lan t 21766% 181% 75% 100% 84% 31%
Total inventory/Total sales 0% 1% 1% 1% 2% 3%
Total liabilities/Total equity -111% -239% 937% 604% -232% 126%
T otal receivab le sT o ta l inventory 37% 265% 73% 126% 174% 264%
Q uick  assets/Current liabilities 6% 67% 61% 74% 65% 251%
T otal cash/Total assets 42% 11% 7% 8% 14% 21%
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Ameristar Argosy Aztar
Year 1995 1994 1993 1992 1996 1995
Altman Ratios:
Working capital/Total assets 2% 10% 6% -52% -!% -3%
Retained eamings/Total assets 11% 11% 9% 12% 4% 2%
Eamings B4 interest & taxesTotal assets 9% 8% 16% 111% 9% 5%
Market value/Total debt 154% 435% 105434% 471% 81% 70%
SalesTotal assets 61% 91% 71% 276% 69% 57%
Deakin Ratios:
Net income/Total assets 4% 3% 11% 72% 2% 0%
Current assetsTotal assets 17% 12% 19% 15% 10% 7%
Casli/Total assets 7% 7% 8% 13% 4% 3%
Current assets/Current liabilities 115% 554% 142% 22% 94% 72%
Sales/Current assets 366% 764% 383% 1874% 686% 783%
Zavgren Ratios:
Net incom eTotal equity 13% 7% 13% 541% 5% -1%
Total sales/Net plant 76% 106% 126% 339% 84% 67%
Total inventoryTotal sales 2% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1%
Total liabilitiesTotal equity 211% 121% 17% 648% 155% 182%
Total receivablesTotal inventory 39% 40% 259% 40% 556% 324%
Quick assets/Current liabilities 53% 362% 64% 20% 71% 47%
Total cashTotal assets 7% 7% 8% 13% 4% 3%
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Boomtown Boyd Gaming Caesar's
Year 1995 1994 1997 1995 1994 1993
Altman Ratios;
Working capital/Total assets 4% -1% 0% -1% 10% 8%
Retained eamingsTotal assets 1% 2% 5% 14% 47% 42%
Eamings B4 interest & taxes/Total assets 5% -2% -5% 11% 15% 17%
Market value/Total debt 48% 74% 37% 104% 112% 131%
Sales/Total assets 97% 43% 80% 81% 100% 103%
Deakin Ratios:
Net income/Total assets -1% -3% -8% 3% 8% 9%
Current assets/Total assets 14% 10% 9% 9% 27% 25%
Cash/Total assets 9% 5% 5% 5% 14% 11%
Current assets/Current liabilities 136% 93% 96% 91% 154% 146%
Sales/Current assets 687% 440% 858% 894% 367% 408%
Zavgren Ratios:
Net income/Total equity -3% -7% -41% 12% 14% 18%
Total sales/Net plant 154% 66% 110% 97% 162% 160%
Total inventory.Total sales 1% 3% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Total liabilities/Total equity 127% 121% 438% 309% 83% 102%
Total receivables/Total inventory 34% 44% 199% 246% 549% 581%
Quick assets/Current liabilities 87% 50% 73% 68% 120% 106%
Total cash/Total assets 9% 5% 5% 5% 14% 11%
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Casino America Circus Circus Harvey's
Year 1997 1996 1997 1996 1994 1993
AJtman Ratios:
Working capital'Total assets 2% -5% 1% 1% 3% 4%
Retained eamings/Total assets 3% 16% 36% 40% 41% 42%
Eamings B4 interest & taxes/Total assets 3% 9% 8% 12% 5% 6%
Market value/Total debt 108% 193% 166% 542% 216% 127%
Sales/Total assets 71% 70% 49% 59% 56% 62%
Deakin Ratios:
Net income/Total assets -27% 3% 10% 11% 4% 5%
Current assets/Total assets 15% 12% 6% 6% 11% 12%
Cash/Total assets 10% 8% 3% 3% 3% 5%
Current assets/Current liabilities 113% 71% 117% 132% 130% 153%
Sales/Current assets 479% 577% 879% 1032% 490% 531%
Zavgren Ratios:
Net income/Total equity -27% 3% 10% 11% 4% 5%
Total sales/Net plant 132% 122% 69% 88% 67% 79%
Total inventory/Total sales 0% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2%
Total liabilities-Total equity 578% 351% 174% 79% 93% 137%
Total receivables/Total inventory 270% 171% 178% 79% 91% 117%
Quick assets/Current liabilities 81% 53% 80% 83% 50% 87%
Total cash/Total assets 10% 8% 3% 3% 3% 5%
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 5 (con't)
Financial Ratios for Non-Failed Casinos
61
Hollywood Park Lady Luck Mirage
Year 1995 1994 1997 1996 1994 1993
Altman Ratios:
Working capital/Total assets r/o 3% 0% 5% 1% 2%
Retained eam ingsTotal assets -1% -5% -11% -14% 40% 36%
Eamings B4 interest & taxesTotal assets 5% 0% 13% 11% 16% 16%
Market valueTotal debt 168% 56085% 40% 50% 824% 1282%
SalesTotal assets 59% 70% 72% 69% 64% 74%
Deakin Ratios:
Net incom eTotal assets 2% -2% 3% 2% 10% 9%
Current assetsTotal assets 14% 20% 9% 16% 11% 12%
C ashTotal assets 6% 8% 7% 10% 4% 3%
Current assets/Current liabilities 105% 116% 103% 149% 108% 123%
Sales/Current assets 412% 350% 786% 425% 579% 619%
Zavgren Ratios:
Net incom eTotal equity 4% -3% 97% 230% 16% 13%
Total sales/Net plant 83% 109% 93% 96% 79% 92%
Total inventoryTotal sales 1% 2% 1% 1% 2% 2%
Total liabilitiesTotal equity 88% 28% 3182% 10360% 66% 48%
Total receivablesTotal inventory 577% 291% 107% 67% 255% 300%
Quick assets/Current liabilities 59% 67% 84% 96% 70% 72%
Total cash/Total assets 6% 8% 7% 10% 4% 3%
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
62
Table 6
Bankruptcy Prediction Model Results for Failed Casinos
Altman Zavgren
Year One Year Prior Two Years Prior One Year Prior Two Years Prior
Arizona Charlies 1.002 0.874 0.553 0.857
Bally's Grand 0.815 0.973 0.179 0.246
Claridge 1.279 1.172 0.605 0.941
Debbie Reynolds 0.623 0.776 0.325 0.882
Four Queens 0.918 0.922 2.045 (0.451)
Gold River 0.290 1.088 (1.118) 0.089
Gold River 1.238 0.583 0.294 (0.192)
Palace 0.922 0.072 (0.372) (0.323)
Resorts Inter'l 0.746 0.765 0.466 1.709
Sands - Atl Cty 16.470 1.268 0.481 0.312
Santa Fe 0.485 0.654 (0.171) (0.026)
Stratosphere 0.513 0.152 0.330 0.197
Deakin - Linear Deakin - Quadratic
Year One Year Prior Two Years Prior One Year Prior Two Years Prior
Arizona Charhes (0.891) (1.102) 3.504 (15.080)
Bally's Grand (6.272) (0.515) (64.627) (67.343)
Claridge (0.590) (1.184) (12.778) (8.617)
Debbie Reynolds (10.269) (10.527) (32.625) (35.383)
Four Queens (1.229) 0.067 8.932 3.204
Gold River (1.012) 1.319 (20.688) (10.696)
Gold River 16.113 (7.620) (102.610) 0.592
Palace 16.266 (28.422) (157.136) (266.821)
Resorts Inter'l 11.844 42.861 (70.949) (715.488)
Sands - Atl Cty (14.190) (2.115) (11.399) (10.231)
Santa Fe (0.906) 1.137 (6.434) (9.617)
Stratosphere (27.249) (0.451) (258.120) (35.579)
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Table 7
Bankruptcy Prediction Model Results forNon-Failed Casinos
Altman Zavgren
Year One Year Prior Two Years Prior One Year Prior Two Years Prior
Ameristar 0.626 0.943 0.151 0.285
Argosy 7.046 2.818 0.204 (0.027)
Aztar 0.702 0.571 0.102 0.121
Boomtown 0.973 0.437 0.281 0.288
Boyd Gaming 0.796 0.824 0.032 0.083
Caesar's 1.016 1.048 0.140 0.125
Casino America 0.718 0.713 (0.041) 0.068
Circus Circus 0.506 0.629 0.158 0.216
Harvey's 0.578 0.635 0.197 0.183
Hollywood Park 0.603 4.060 0.122 0.193
Lady Luck 0.727 0.693 (1.138) (4.248)
Mirage 0.698 0.830 0.189 0.191
Deakin - Linear Deakin - Quadratic
Year One Year Prior Two Years Prior One Year Prior Two Years Prior
Ameristar 0.341 2.737 (13.355) (70.832)
Argosy 1.487 12.312 (18.259) (2.028)
Aztar 0.573 0.355 (5.367) (0.067)
Boomtown 0.292 (0.638) (10.738) (7.350)
Boyd Gaming (0.392) 1.107 (1.044) (0.491)
Caesar's 0.952 1.153 (23.221) (21.073)
Casino America (3.784) 0.420 (13.935) (5.375)
Circus Circus 2.223 2.596 (4.158) (2.295)
Harvey's 0.659 0.983 (12.146) (14.298)
Hollywood Park 0.107 (0.554) (10.962) (14.222)
Lady Luck 0.909 0.276 (3.900) (16.069)
Mirage 1.498 1.573 (10.051) (11.697)
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Table 8
Bankruptcy Prediction Model Classifications o f  Failed Casinos
Altman Zavgren
Year One Year Prior Two Years Prior One Year Prior Two Years Prior
Arizona Charlies Failed Failed Unclassified Non-Failed
Bally's Grand Failed Failed Failed Failed
Claridge Failed Failed Unclassified Non-Failed
Debbie Reynolds Failed Failed Unclassified Non-Failed
Four Queens Failed Failed Non-Failed Failed
Gold River Failed Failed Failed Failed
Gold River Failed Failed Failed Failed
Palace Failed Failed Failed Failed
Resorts Inter'l Failed Failed Unclassified Non-Failed
Sands - Atl Cty Non-Failed Failed Unclassified Unclassified
Santa Fe Failed Failed Failed Failed
Stratosphere Failed Failed Unclassified Failed
Deakin - Linear Deakin - Quadratic
Year One Year Prior Two Years Prior One Year Prior Two Years Prior
Arizona Charlies Failed Failed Failed Failed
Bally's Grand Failed Failed Non-Failed Non-F ai led
Claridge Failed Failed Failed Failed
Debbie Reynolds Failed Failed Failed Failed
Four Queens Failed Non-Failed Failed Failed
Gold River Failed Non-Failed Failed Failed
Gold River Non-Failed Failed Non-Failed Failed
Palace Non-Failed Failed Non-Failed Non-Failed
Resorts Inter'l Non-Failed Non-Failed Non-Failed Non-Failed
Sands - Atl Cty Failed Failed Failed Failed
Santa Fe Failed Non-Failed Failed Failed
Stratosphere Failed Failed Non-Failed Failed
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Table 9
Bankruptcy Prediction Model Classifications o f  Non-Failed Casinos
Altman Zavgren
Year One Year Prior Two Years Prior One Year Prior Two Years Prior
Ameristar Failed Failed Failed Failed
Argosy Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed Failed
Aztar Failed Failed Failed Failed
Boomtown Failed Failed Failed Failed
Boyd Gaining Failed Failed Failed Failed
Caesar's Failed Failed Failed Failed
Casino America Failed Failed Failed Failed
Circus Circus Failed Failed Failed Failed
Harvey's Failed Failed Failed Failed
Hollywood Park Failed Non-Failed Failed Failed
Lady Luck Failed Failed Failed Failed
M irage Failed Failed Failed Failed
Deakin - Linear Deakin - Quadratic
Year One Year Prior Two Years Prior One Year Prior Two Years Prior
Ameristar Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed Non-Failed
Argosy Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed Failed
Aztar Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed Failed
Boomtown Non-Failed Failed Failed Failed
Boyd Gaming Failed Non-Failed Failed Failed
Caesar's Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed Failed
Casino America Failed Non-Failed Failed Failed
Circus Circus Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed Failed
Harvey's Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed Failed
Hollywood Park Non-Failed Failed Failed Failed
Lady Luck Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed Failed
Mirage Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed Failed
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Table 10
Prediction Accuracy Matrix for Altman Model
One Year Prior to Failure:
Predicted Group Membership
Acmal Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 11 I 12 0
Non-Bankrupt 11 1 12 0
Total 22 2 24 0
Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 92% 8% 100% 0%
Non-Bankrupt 92% 8% 100% 0%
Total 50% 0%
Two Years Prior to Failure:
Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 12 0 12 0
Non-Bankrupt 10 2 12 0
Total 22 2 24 0
Predicted Group Membership
Acmal Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 100% 0% 100% 0%
Non-Bankrupt 83% 17% 100% 0%
Total 58% 0%
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Table 11
Prediction Accuracy Matrix for Deakin Linear Model
One Year Prior to Failure:
Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 9 3 12 0
Non-Bankrupt 2 10 12 0
Total 11 13 24 0
Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 75% 25% 100% 0%
Non-Bankrupt 17% 83% 100% 0%
Total 79% 0%
Two Years Prior to Failure:
Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 8 4 12 0
Non-Bankrupt 2 10 12 0
Total 10 14 24 0
Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 67%o 3394 100% 0%
Non-Bankrupt 17% 83% 100% 0%
Total 75% 0%
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Table 12
Prediction Accuracy Matrix for Deakin Quadratic Model
O ne Y ear Prior to Failure:
Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 7 5 12 0
Non-Bankrupt 12 0 12 0
Total 19 5 24 0
Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 58% 42% 10094 0%
Non-Bankrupt 100% 0% 10094 0%
Total 29% 0%
Two Years Prior to Failure:
Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 9 3 12 0
Non-Bankrupt 11 1 12 0
Total 20 4 24 0
Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 7594 2594 10094 0%
Non-Bankrupt 92% 8«% 10094 0%
Total 42% 0%
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Table 13
Prediction Accuracy Matrix for Deakin Combined Models
One Year P rio r to Failure:
Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 7 3 12 2
Non-Bankrupt 2 0 12 10
Total 9 3 24 12
Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 58% 25% 83% 17%
Non-Bankrupt 17% 0% 17% 83%
Total 29% 50%
Two Years P rio r to Failure:
Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 7 1 12 4
Non-Bankrupt 2 1 12 9
Total 9 2 24 13
Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 58% 8% 67% 33%
Non-Bankrupt 17% 8% 25% 75%
Total 33% 54%
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Table 14
Prediction Accuracy Matrix for Zavgren Model
One Y ear Prior to Failure:
Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 5 1 12 6
Non-Bankrupt 12 0 12 0
Total 17 1 24 6
Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 42% 8% 50% 50%
Non-Bankrupt 100% 0% 100% 0%
Total 21% 25%
Two Years Prior to Failure:
Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 7 4 12 1
Non-Bankrupt 12 0 12 0
Total 19 4 24 1
Predicted Group Membership
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Total Non-Classified
Bankrupt 58% 33% 92% 8%
Non-Bankrupt 100% 0% 100% 0%
Total 29% 4%
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CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY
This section, contains an analysis of the results o f the tests o f the models for the 
casinos included in the study. Explanations for the major findings are discussed. The 
nature o f  the data and the variables used in the models are also reviewed.
An evaluation o f  each o f  the models examines their predictive ability and 
limitations. A determination o f the answer to the study’s research problem is presented.
Also presented are questions that arose during tlie study and topics that the study 
suggests might be appropriate for additional research.
Results o f tests
The basis for evaluating the contributions o f  the models is a naïve prediction. The 
naïve prediction would be that in a sample population that contained exactly the same 
number o f failed and non-failed firms, assigning an individual firm to one group or 
another on a random basis would, on average, result in a correct classification 50% o f the 
time.
The Altman model had an accuracy rate o f  50% one year prior to bankruptcy and 
58% two years prior. These results do not suggest any incremental value to the
71
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prediction decision. The major weakness o f the Altman model is that it predicts failure 
for all but two firms in each of the two years tested. While it is generally agreed that a 
type two error, predicting failure for a non-failing firm, is less costly than a type one 
error, predicting failure in all cases except absolutely certain successes would preclude 
almost all investment decisions.
In looking at the Altman prediction formula, the emphasis on the comparison to 
the level o f  investment is obvious. Four o f the five variables have total assets as the 
denominator. One of the problems with using total assets as a basis for determining 
efSciency in the casino industry is that a large proportion o f a casinos assets are not 
productive assets. Many o f the firms in the smdy had a large portion o f  their assets in the 
construction in progress account. There also may be a large amoimt o f  intangible assets 
caused by licensing and pre-opening costs that are being amortized.
While the emphasis o f Altman’s formula on the amount o f  total assets and the low 
level o f productive assets in the casino industry explains why the results are low, it does 
not justify the results. While a low amount o f working capital indicates the utilization of 
a low cost source o f capital, firom vendors, employees and government, it increases the 
level o f  overall risk o f the organization. Current liabihties are, by definition, due 
currently, within twelve months or less, and allowing the amount o f  liabilities to become 
too large can create a higher degree o f vulnerability to periodic fluctuations in business.
Unlike a manufacturing firm, casinos do not purchase a large volume o f raw 
materials that are then used in the process o f creating the product to be sold. Labor and 
otlier direct costs are consumed almost immediately coincident with the related sales. 
This cycle results in the casino paying for its costs with the proceeds o f  future sales rather
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than the sales o f the goods being used to pay for its own costs. In a manufacturing 
situation the raw materials are usually purchased sufficiently prior to their consumption 
in a finished product that they are paid for before the proceeds o f the sale are realized or 
at least at the same time as the proceeds are realized. This cash flow process would seem 
to make the casino industry more risky, as its success depends more heavily on the 
outcome o f future events. It does not necessarily indicate a greater likelihood of failure, 
but it certainly does increase risk. Casinos might be well advised to take better advantage 
of early payment discounts and reduce their levels of current liabilities relative to their 
current assets.
Another factor that impacts the Altman formula is the level o f short-term debt that 
casinos are carrying. Casinos have historically been placed in the position o f not being 
able to obtain an adequate level o f long-term debt to achieve an equalization o f the lives 
of its fixed assets and the length o f the debt repayment schedule for the debt on those 
assets. The recent trends o f some o f the larger casino companies to become more 
dependent on short-term bank loans and lines o f  credit will exacerbate this problem. The 
casino industry’s dependence on short-term debt could easily increase the vulnerability o f 
the industry to failure, and should be carefully monitored and studied.
The final issue raised by the Altman model is the level o f  debt carried by the 
casinos relative to the amount o f their equity value. When calculating the market value 
of the firm to debt ratio, the publicly traded casinos show a strong relationship, indicating 
the popularity o f casino stocks in recent years. The questions o f the appropriateness o f 
debt level relative to the total investment or to the amount o f equity are not addressed in 
the Altman model.
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The Deakin models present different results. Deakin’s linear model has an overall 
accuracy rate o f 79% one year prior to failure and 75% two years prior. While these 
results are clearly superior to the results o f  a naïve selection process, they do not come 
close to the 97.5% success rate he achieved in his original study. The other two models 
do not come close to the accuracy o f a naïve selection process. The quadratic function 
only achieved an accuracy rate o f 29% one year prior to failure and 42% two years prior. 
The combined model results were 29% and 33% respectively for one and two years prior 
to failure.
Like the Altman model’s variables, the Deakin model variables are heavily 
influenced by the value o f the total assets o f  the firm. In the linear equation, the highest 
weight is attributed to the net income to total assets ratio, which measures the return on 
the total investment. This relationship is not considered in any o f the other models, and 
may explain the reason this model exhibits the best prediction accuracy of all the models. 
By comparing net income to total assets, which is the same as total investment, both the 
needs o f the equity holders and the debt holders are considered. This would tend to 
indicate that the failed and the non-failed casinos’ ability to generate or not generate an 
appropriate return do accurately indicate their likelihood o f success.
The significance o f cash and o f current assets relative to the total capitalization of 
the casinos is the primary reason for the failure of the quadratic equation to accurately 
predict failure in the casino business. The required levels o f cash in the casino industry 
are highly dependent upon regulatory requirements, and do not really vary significantly 
between a successful firm and an unsuccessful firm. The levels o f  cash and working 
capital are to the Deakin model, as in the Altman model, important factors about which
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the casino industry should probably be more attentive, but they do not appear to be 
significant disciitninators between failing and non-failing firms.
The relationships o f  the Deakin quadratic model do not appear to provide any 
discriininating information concerning the viability o f  a casino. According to Deakin, all 
the casinos are going to fail. Due to the differences in predictive ability between his 
linear model and his quadratic model it would appear that the primary distinguishing 
characteristic is the return on investment, and that the coefficients o f  the quadratic model 
are not appropriate for casinos.
The Zavgren model has the lowest classification accuracy o f  the three models. 
One year prior to failure, the model only classified 75% of the firms and then correctly 
classified only 21%. Two years out classified a higher percentage o f  the firms, 96%, but 
only did slightly better at classification, 29%. This accuracy level is significantly lower 
than what would be expected firom a naïve classification.
The Zavgren model uses inventory levels in two of the variables o f the model. In 
the casino business, inventory levels are not as important as they would be in a 
manufacturing or a retailing firm. Relationships between inventory levels and sales or 
between receivables and sales would generally not be indicative o f  any poor management 
decisions in the casino business.
The return on equity ratio also does not seem to work for a casino. Because o f the 
high leverage rates o f many casinos, equity holders may appear to be achieving 
acceptable returns if  the debt holders are ignored. Since this is the effect of computing 
return on equity without any return on liabilities or total investment being considered, the
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result is non-discrimination. The other ratios in the Zavgren equation reflect the same 
measurement problems o f  the casino industry as seen in the Altman and Deakin models.
Evaluation o f models & conclusions 
The traditional bankruptcy prediction models tested do not provide significant 
incremental information for predicting bankruptcy in the casino industry. Only a part o f 
one o f  the models showed results that were superior to what would be expected firom a 
naïve classification. A possible explanation for the inability o f the models to perform 
adequately in the casino industry is that the original studies were done using 
manufacturing companies, which typically exhibit financial structures that are different 
than what is seen in the casino industry.
The Altman Z score, which is often quoted in investment banker reports has been 
widely used in all types o f  businesses, including casinos, had an accuracy classification 
rate o f  only 50% in year one of the test, and 58% in year two. While it accurately 
predicted failure for 92% o f the firms that failed, it did this at the expense o f  erroneously 
predicting failure in 92% o f the firms that did not fail. The same rate would have been 
achieved by saying that all casinos are going to fail.
The Deakin linear model did better than the Altman model, achieving a  prediction 
accuracy rate of 79% in year one and 75% in year two. While this represents a positive 
contribution to overall knowledge o f the firm’s total financial information, the rates and 
types o f errors can confuse this information. The type one errors were fairly high at 25% 
and 33%, and would probably not represent an acceptable level relative to the risk o f 
investing in a firm that is likely to fail.
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The Deakin quadratic model and the combined results model did not perform as 
well as a naïve prediction, at 29% in year one and 42% and 33% for year two. The 
models also produced conflicting results in three of the years. The type two errors were 
higher than the type one errors in both years for the quadratic model, at 100% and 92% 
versus 42% and 25%, but both types o f errors are higher than acceptable. While the error 
rates were higher in the combined model, only 46% o f the firms were classified.
The Zavgren model achieved the lowest classification accuracy at 21% and 29% 
for year one and year two respectively. The Zavgren model also had a high rate o f  non­
classified firms, 25% in year one and 4% in year two. The type two errors for those firms 
classified by the Zavgren model were 100% in each test period and 33% type one errors 
in year two. The accuracy level would have been much higher by simply saying that all 
casinos will fail.
The answer to the problem statement of this study is that traditional bankruptcy 
prediction models do not provide significant incremental information concerning 
financial performance in the casino industry.
Areas for future research 
This study indicates that the financial characteristics o f  the casino industry are 
sufficiently different firom traditional manufacturing and retail businesses that there is 
probably a need for a set o f financial measurements that reflects its own qualities.
1. As seen in the Zavgren model, inventories are probably not significant to the 
casino business.
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2. Receivables are probably more important to financial strength and stability in the 
casino business than in other businesses. How long it takes to collect versus the 
terms o f  current liabilities. The proportions o f total sales that are cash or on- 
account and how much o f the receivables are collectable.
3. What are proper levels or proportions o f working capital? A large amount o f  cash 
is required in a casino, for the cage operations, for potential jackpot payoffs and 
for slot machine loads. There is a reluctance to keep even more cash just for 
working capital, but maybe it is necessary to reduce the likelihood o f  slow 
business periods. The amount o f  the cash need for a casino is particularly 
sensitive during the initial stages o f  a new casino or a casino expansion. While 
not a part o f  the sample studied, there are examples o f  casinos that got into 
financial problems due at least in part to the under-estimation o f  initial bankroll 
and the length o f the start-up period.
4. Due to the types o f financing generally available to casinos, and the often short­
term nature o f  that financing, repayment abihty needs to be closely monitored. 
The relationship between total debt service and cash flow from operations could 
be critical to a casino’s future.
5. Another aspect o f  the casino business that would seem to be significant is the high 
level o f labor costs. Some measure o f  labor costs relative to sales or debt service 
might provide additional insight to the health o f the casino.
6. All o f the factors o f the casino business could be modeled into a health model, if 
there was sufficient data available to conduct a reliable study.
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7. A model for bankruptcy prediction specifically designed for the service and 
hospitality industries could be developed using the techniques o f previous studies 
with ratios more aligned to the service and hospitality industries.
8. More than anything else, this study has shown the critical need to develop a more 
extensive data base o f financial information for casinos in order to be able to 
analyze the industry. The barriers o f  secrecy are being broken by legal reporting 
requirements, but more property specific operational and financial data would 
allow management o f  the industry to make better decisions.
Summary
This study has shown that traditional financial analysis techniques may not be 
satisfactory for analyzing the casino business. More financial information needs to be 
accumulated and analyzed so that there is a better understanding o f what characterizes a 
healthy casino and what a financial model o f a healthy casino would look like. Non- 
traditional, casino specific measurements could provide valuable information to enhance 
the professional management o f the casino industry.
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